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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Despite the plethora of varied international relations theories, only a select few have 
actually been drivers of United States foreign policy. In fact, outside of the Kissinger 
years, two theories have had the most influence on US foreign policy- neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism. While surely the purpose of all IR theories is not (nor should be) to 
‘problem solve’, it seems natural that ‘problem solving’ theories influence government 
leaders and technocrats more than postmodern ‘lenses’, for the objective of government 
leaders is primarily to solve problems, not chronicling how specific points of view came 
to be. Interestingly, neoconservatism is not often thought of as an IR theory in the 
traditional sense. Part of this has to with the individuals who identify as neoconservative. 
Whereas neorealists, neoliberals, and social constructivists can point to academics like 
Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, and Alexander Wendt, respectively, for their founding, 
the “godfather of neoconservatism”1 Irving Kristol was a newspaper columnist and 
editor. Most of the prominent neoconservatives following Kristol were similarly 
journalists, politicians, or government officials, with notable exceptions.2 As a result, 
neoconservatism as an ideology is often equated with the foreign policy decisions by 
‘neocons’.  
Furthermore, neoconservatives themselves scoff at the notion that their ideology is a 
cohesive doctrine. Kristol himself was surprised that of the media attention that 
neoconservatism has received, nearly all of it has been primarily focused on foreign 
policy “since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a 
                                                
1 Gewen, Barry. “Irving Kristol, Godfather of Modern Conservatism, Dies at 89.” The New York Times, 
September 18, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/us/politics/19kristol.html. 
2 Francis Fukuyama (formerly), Seymour Martin Lipset, and Robert Kagan are among these exceptions. 
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set of attitudes derived from historical experience.”3 But nearly every IR theory claims to 
be based on historical experience, and a set of attitudes can mean as much or as little as 
the interpreter deems it. Kristol’s core four ‘theses’ of neoconservative foreign policy are 
as follows: 
1. Patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by 
both private and public institutions. 
2. International institutions that point to an ultimate world government should be 
regarded with the deepest suspicion. 
3. Statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from 
enemies. 
4. For a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term.4 
 
 
If we are to take Kristol at face value, clearly there is no point of going forward with 
looking at neoconservatism as an IR theory, for his set of attitudes is just that. And yet, 
his four core theses are built upon a series of assumptions, including that about regime 
type, anarchy, interest formation, and collective security that make it appear to be much 
closer to an IR theory than a simple ‘persuasion.’ 
In this paper, I seek to answer the following questions: Can neoconservatism be 
considered an international relations theory, or is it something else, like a “school of 
American foreign policy”5 or a “cultural orientation to foreign policy in America,”6 or 
even something less, like Kristol himself argues? If it is the former, is neoconservatism a 
unique theory in and of itself, or is it a variation of an already existing theory, like 
                                                
3 Kristol, Irving. “The Neoconservative Persuasion.” Weekly Standard, August 25, 2003. 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-neoconservative-persuasion/article/4246. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Krauthammer, Charles. “In Defense of Democratic Realism.” The National Interest, no. 77 (2004): 15–
25, p. 15. 
6 Crothers, Lane. “The Cultural Roots of Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign Policy.” 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 21–34. doi:10.1080/14794012.2011.550774, p. 
25. 
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neorealism or neoliberalism? What assumptions, either ontological or epistemological, 
does neoconservatism share with these theories? 
This analysis of neoconservatism will help to address a larger topic in IR- what qualifies 
as an international relations theory? Thus, the main research question builds upon and 
adds to existing literature on the nature of IR theory itself. 
I argue that neoconservatism is itself an international relations theory separate and 
distinct from other theories like neoliberalism and neorealism. Though it shares some 
common elements with these and other theories, neoconservatism’s conception of regime 
type makes it irreconcilable with structural theories. Moreover, though neoconservatism 
does make several foreign policy recommendations, it is not simply a school of foreign 
policy analysis. Just as the existence of a realist school (and its many variations) of 
foreign policy analysis does not lead to the invalidation of realism as an IR theory, nor 
does it for neoconservatism. Ultimately, I argue that, at least for ontological theories, an 
IR theory is a theory that explains the causal factors of how states interact with each 
other. Neoconservatism, linking its view of regime type to the nature of the actions of 
states, does this, and in fact in many ways is similar to liberal theories of IR. 
Literature Review 
One reason why neoconservatism has not formally been placed within or separate to 
different IR theories is that it doesn’t just overlap with one IR theory, but it shares 
principles with many IR theories. Neoconservatism shares the Wilsonian, liberal, 
conception of individualism, human rights, and the democratic peace theory while at the 
same time sharing the skepticism that realism has for the efficacy of institutions and 
6 
collective security. The emphasis on the importance of military power in order to 
maximize one’s security seems incredibly realist. Furthermore, “neoconservatives share 
the classical realist view that war and conflict are ultimately rooted in man’s drive for 
self-preservation, competition, vainglory, and...universal recognition.” And yet, almost in 
a thin constructivist manner, neoconservatives “insist that these natural impulses are 
cultivated, mediated and channeled by historically evolving institutions, ideology, and 
cultural norms.7 Because “its proponents speak of power and morality, credibility, 
interests and values,”8 neoconservatism to a certain extent turns the third debate on its 
head, agreeing with many of the premises of the neo-neo consensus while also drawing 
entirely different conclusions than both.  
The propagation of neoconservatism by columnists and policymakers has resulted in a 
theory that is not simply victim to American bias, but is necessarily centered on the US. 
Neoconservatives see “American power as essentially benign,” arguing that “a return to 
multipolar balance-of-power would be a direct threat to both American security interests 
and the international order.”9 This is not to say that other theories, like realism, don’t 
suffer from a western bias, but neoconservatism, if we are to consider it an IR theory, 
would be alone in advocating for hegemony to rest not just in a single power, but in a 
particular power. In this way, neoconservatism can seem almost intrinsically tied to US 
foreign policy. If we are to view neoconservatism as a legitimate IR theory, can it be so 
                                                
7 Drolet, Jean-François. “A Liberalism Betrayed? American Neoconservatism and the Theory of 
International Relations.” Journal of Political Ideologies 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 89–118. 
doi:10.1080/13569317.2010.482361, p. 95. 
8 Owens, Patricia. “Beyond Strauss, Lies, and the War in Iraq: Hannah Arendt’s Critique of 
Neoconservatism.” Review of International Studies 33, no. 2 (2007): 265–83, p. 266. Emphasis not mine. 
9 Schmidt, Brian C., and Michael C. Williams. “The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives 
Versus Realists.” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (May 22, 2008): 191–220. doi:10.1080/09636410802098990. 
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attached to the US? That is, if the US were to ever wane in power and lose its ability to 
act unilaterally, could another country fill the theoretical gap? John Mearsheimer, an 
offensive realist, argues that the bipolarity of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and 
the United States resulted in a safer world, but this was due to their balance of 
capabilities, not anything intrinsic in the countries themselves.10 Would, could, a 
neoconservative say the same thing about unipolarity? These questions are yet to be 
answered. 
Jonathan Caverley argues that neoconservatism has little in common with liberalism, for 
neoconservatives hold that “conflict groups (i.e. states) are the key actors in world 
politics, power is the fundamental feature of international relations and the essential 
nature of international relations is conflictual” and that they “place their trust in military 
force and doubt that economic sanctions or UN intervention or diplomacy, per se, 
constitute meaningful alternatives.”11 He argues that the only “big ideas” of liberalism, as 
articulated by G John Ikenberry, shared by neoconservatism are “the importance of 
democracy as an American national interest and of American moral global leadership” 
and as such neoconservatism is actually much closer to neoclassical realism. 
Robert Kagan, a neoconservative himself, would dismiss this claim, as neoconservatism 
has “a potent moralism and idealism in world affairs, a belief in America's exceptional 
role as a promoter of the principles of liberty and democracy, a belief in the preservation 
of American primacy in the exercise of power, including military power, as a tool for 
defending and advancing moralistic and idealistic causes, as well as a suspicion of 
                                                
10 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company, 2014. 
11 Caverley, pp. 598-599. 
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international institutions and a tendency towards unilateralism.”12 Kagan argues that 
neoconservatism is not a new concept, but rather a continuation of past American views 
of the world, drawing on examples like the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and even 
“concern over Japan’s plundering of Manchuria” during the supposed ‘isolationist’ 
1930s.13 Furthermore, the sources of the “enduring power” of this tradition is “American 
commitment to universal principles embedded in the nation’s founding documents.”14 
Other scholars such as Benjamin Miller say that neoconservatism “in fact epitomizes the 
offensive liberal approach to US foreign policy...: a combination of a liberal belief in 
democracy and its pacifying effects with an offensive willingness to employ a massive 
force for regime change (and distrust of international institutions as ineffective and 
constraining U.S. policy).15 Miller breaks both realism and liberalism into two factions, 
offensive and defensive. Additionally, he divides the factors that lead to policies 
reflecting these theories into means and objectives vis-à-vis the adversary, with 
objectives dichotomized into those that affect the balance of capabilities and those that 
affect the rival’s fundamental intentions/nature of domestic regime and means 
dichotomized into unilateralist and multilateralist approaches.16 
Charles Krauthammer similarly divides neoconservative foreign policy into two camps, 
democratic globalism and democratic realism. The former, which includes advocates like 
                                                
12 Kagan, Robert. “Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776.” World Affairs 170, no. 4 (2008): 13–35, 
pp. 14-15. 
13 Ibid, 18. 
14 Ibid, 24. 
15 Miller, Benjamin. “Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, 
and the War in Iraq.” Security Studies 19, no. 1 (February 26, 2010): 26–65. 
doi:10.1080/09636410903546426, p. 54. 
16 Miller, Benjamin. “Democracy Promotion: Offensive Liberalism versus the Rest (of IR Theory).” 
Millennium 38, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 561–91. doi:10.1177/0305829810366475. 
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Kagan and William Kristol, is what is commonly thought of as neoconservative foreign 
policy. It understands “that as a rule, fellow democracies provide the most secure 
alliances and the most stable relationships,” necessitating that nations with the ability to 
spread democracy do so.17 The latter he describes with the following axiom: “We will 
support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places 
where there is a strategic necessity–meaning, places central to the larger war against the 
existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.”18 
Differentiating democratic realism from neoclassical realism is significantly trickier, for 
Krauthammer’s realism is not well defined, essentially distilling into a realism that cares 
about regime types, the extent to which said regime type is a threat to freedom. If 
neoclassical realism is a realism that acknowledges that the influence of systemic forces 
on “foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated 
through intervening variables at the unit level,”19 then democratic realism could 
potentially be seen as a more limited version neoclassical realism insofar as ‘threats to 
freedom’ are some of the ‘intervening variables at the unit level.’ Though I will attempt 
to place Krauthammer’s idea into the framework of neoconservatism, I suspect that it will 
not fit well.  
Schmidt and Williams note that neoconservatism separates itself from realism “along 
three reinforcing lines.” First, neoconservatives define interest not merely as “narrowly 
                                                
17 Krauthammer, Charles. “In Defense of Democratic Realism.” The National Interest, no. 77 (2004): 15–
25, p. 16. 
18 Krauthammer, Charles. “Democratic Realism.” presented at the 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture AEI Annual 
Dinner, February 10, 2004. https://www.aei.org/publication/democratic-realism/. 
19 Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” Edited by Michael E. Brown, 
Thomas J. Christensen, Randall L. Schweller, William Curti Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria. World Politics 
51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72, p. 146. 
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strategic material calculation,” but as an expression of national values. As a result of 
being “unable to connect adequately to the values and identity of the American people,”20 
a realist foreign policy will fail to generate either the commitment or the resources 
necessary to ensure its success. Finally, the disconnect between government and populace 
generated by realist policy will lead to distrust and cynicism of the former by the latter. 
In a similar vein to Alexander Wendt, neoconservatives draw on scholars that “discuss 
the importance of ideas in determining social outcomes while emphasizing how 
individuals and social structures in which they are embedded act in shaping one 
another.”21 While neoconservatives believe that these mutually constructed norms are 
significantly stickier than Wendt does (and much stickier than thick constructivists), the 
principle of constructivism “that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the 
basis of meanings that the objects have for them”22 fits neatly into neoconservative 
thought. 
Williams offers the strongest explanation of how neoconservatives view the ‘national 
interest’ by connecting this concept with their view on the ‘public interest.’ He writes that 
“the national interest and public interest become elements of a politically virtuous 
circle.”23 The national interest in effect is an expression of “the operation of political 
                                                
20 Schmidt, Brian C., and Michael C. Williams. “The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives 
Versus Realists.” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (May 22, 2008): 191–220. doi:10.1080/09636410802098990, 
pp. 212-213. 
21 Rapport, Aaron. “Unexpected Affinities? Neoconservatism’s Place in IR Theory.” Security Studies 17, 
no. 2 (May 22, 2008): 257–93. doi:10.1080/09636410802098883, p. 261. 
22 Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425, p. 397. 
23 Williams, Michael C. “What Is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory.” 
European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 3 (September 1, 2005): 307–37. 
doi:10.1177/1354066105055482, p. 321. 
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virtue at home.”24 Furthermore, Williams strongly contextualizes neoconservatism within 
the framework of classical realism, highlighting their shared emphasis on human nature 
and the ‘dangerous’ effects that liberal modernity has on society.  
Unfortunately, though Williams argues that “there is a pressing need for IR to treat 
neoconservatism seriously as a theory of international politics”25 and compares it also to 
liberalism and social constructivism, he did not go beyond ‘engagement.’ In other words, 
although Williams laid out some of neoconservatism’s internal logic and compared it to 
other theories, he did not commit to comprehensively framing neoconservatism as a 
theory in and of itself. Like many other works preceding (and proceeding, for that matter) 
his, Williams doesn’t go far enough in developing neoconservatism as a theory, but only 
relates it to existing theories. Likewise, he didn’t even commit to saying that 
neoconservatism is a variation of one theory in particular. This paper argues that 
neoconservatism is most similar to liberalism, but is a separate theory of international 
relations all to itself. 
Methodological Approaches 
This paper is primarily an exercise in meta-theory. I will analyze seminal works of 
theories that are considered to be ‘IR theories’, including, but not limited to, Kenneth 
Waltz’ Theory of International Politics, Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony, Alexander 
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Relations and Robert Cox’s Social Forces, 
States, and World Orders and look at how these works assessed both what is IR theory its 
potential purposes. I will synthesize the commonalities of these views of IR theory and 
                                                
24 Ibid, 322. 
25 Ibid, 324. Emphasis in original. 
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highlight their fundamental differences. I will use this to comment on my own appraisal 
of what is international relations theory. 
As there is no quintessential neoconservative work, I will need to draw upon the writings 
of a wide range of neoconservative writers. Neoconservatives that primarily wrote after 
the end of the Cold War tend to self-identify as neoconservatives; I will take them at their 
word. For those that wrote before fall of the Berlin Wall, I will identify neoconservatives 
based on how they are generally referred to; Jeane Kirkpatrick, for instance, did not self-
identify as a neoconservative, but is overwhelmingly referred to as one, both because of 
her political affiliations and writings. In short, unless a neoconservative self-identifies as 
such, I will defer to the literature. 
And though neoconservatives, namely Kristol, do not set forth neoconservatism as 
anything more than a loosely connected ideology of thinkers with a similar mindset, I 
disagree. Neoconservatism is an international relations theory. There are neoconservative 
theories of domestic policy, but these are only loosely related to the IR theory. There is a 
danger, of course, of begging the question- if the research question is ‘Can 
neoconservatism be considered an IR theory?’, and I take the approach of laying out 
neoconservative arguments as a theory, I run the risk of portraying neoconservatism as 
something that it is not. To mitigate this risk, I will not propose new ideas but instead 
outline the ideas of thinkers like Kristol (in good faith) into a coherent theory. 
Chapter Structure 
I begin in chapter 2 by creating a working definition of international relations theory. I 
compare different academic definitions of IR theory, looking at differences between IR 
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theory and ‘foreign-policy schools,’ and then compare and contrast the definitions of IR 
theory that seminal texts, like those mentioned above, have. I then form a working 
definition of IR theory. Chapter 3 traces the roots of neoconservatism, starting with its 
basis as a reaction to cultural developments in the US in the 1960s and how it branched 
out into distinct, if not sometimes overlapping, assessments of economics, international 
relations, and society. Chapter 4 breaks down neoconservatism’s surprisingly well 
developed basic assumptions pertaining to IR theory, which are essentially derived from 
the monadic democratic peace theory. Chapter 5 compares neoconservatism to the 
theories of the neo-neo debate, looking at its views of anarchy, interest formation, and 
collective security. Moreover, is neoconservatism’s skepticism about collective security 
reconcilable with the democratic peace theory? (As neoconservatives hold both the 
monadic and the dyadic democratic peace theories to be true, I will address both). As 
neoconservatives partially agree with realists about the anarchic nature of the 
international system, can this still be consistent with the democratic peace theory? 
Chapter 6 explains the core differences between neoconservatism and neoclassical 
realism. The conclusion, Chapter 7, addresses why neoconservatism should be viewed as 
an international relations theory as articulated in chapter 2. I look at the foreign policy 
aspect of neoconservatism and argue that it is complementary to neoconservatism as an 
IR theory, growing out of it rather than being mutually exclusive.  
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Chapter 2: Defining International Relations Theory 
Before gauging whether neoconservatism can be regarded as a theory of international 
relations, the concept of international relations theory must be delineated. One of the 
large debates in international relations is its most basic- what is the purpose of 
international relations? At its outset, the answer seems simple: to understand the 
interrelations of nation-states in order to make for a more peaceful world. The ethical 
notion that peace is good and conflict is bad is fundamental to the field. But, over the 
years, this goal has been both broadened and narrowed by a range of theorists, and 
though this seemingly would make it more difficult to consider neoconservatism as a 
theory of international relations, in reality the field has never been more accessible to as 
many ideologies as it has been now. Critical theorists have broken structural theorists’ 
monopoly on IR. This broadening allow neoconservatism to be viewed as a theory of 
international relations without needing to the strict definitions of structural theory. This 
chapter chronicles the progression before outlining the criteria neoconservatism needs to 
meet to be considered an international relations theory. 
Origins of IR Theory 
IR theory as a field of study began as a way to prevent war. In the wake of what was then 
known as the Great War, theorists and politicians alike treated states as anthropomorphic 
entities and projected an optimistic, Kantian perception of human nature onto them. 
Human nature, and therefore states, were at their core inherently good, and thus peace via 
cooperation was not only possible, but inevitable. World War II brought an end to that 
optimism, and theorists flipped the script, projecting a Hobbesian, egoistic conception of 
15 
human nature onto states. States would seek power, material wealth, and glory not 
because of external forces, but because they were hard wired to do so. 
Though other structural theorists came before him, Kenneth Waltz’s conception of IR 
theory revolutionized the field. The founder of neorealism treated social science with all 
of the rigor of the hard sciences. He related his idea of international relations theory to 
theories of astronomers, physicists, and computer scientists. In critiquing Stanley 
Hoffman’s (who had attempted to create a structural theory before Waltz) conception of 
international relations systems, he denounces it as Ptolemaic.26 Waltz was determined to 
create a model for international politics with all the rigor of the hard sciences. His 
fastidious commitment to defining theory is not surprising- he in part developed his 
notion of theory with the aid of the U.S. National Science Foundation. What resulted of 
his studies was a theory that took the result of classical realism’s pessimistic human 
nature, anarchy, and argued that anarchy was in fact a determining factor of state action. 
Because states can never concretely assume another’s intentions, it must act in a relative 
gains maximizing way in order to do what it can to survive. 
In a way, Waltz’ idea of the nature of IR theory is simple- “theories explain laws,”27 the 
latter of which establishes “relations between variables, variables being concepts that can 
take different values.”28 Whereas laws can be induced from sets of statistics, a theory 
must be constructed from a set of assumptions and well-defined units. What results is “a 
depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connection among its parts.”29 
                                                
26 Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 49. 
27 Waltz, p. 6. 
28 Waltz, p. 1. 
29 Waltz, p. 8. 
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Unlike the hard sciences, a theory of international relations must also be an abstraction, a 
“pictured reality while simplifying it, say, through omission or through reduction of 
scale,” only being “indirectly related” to experimentation and observation.30 In fact, 
Waltz argues that international relations as a field has too many variables and observable 
samples that are two small to be theorized any other way. Furthermore, in his view, a 
theory should also be descriptive rather than prescriptive; it should seek to explain the 
world as it is rather than what states should do. Neorealism, for example, argues that 
states always will, as opposed to should, seek to maximize their security. Moreover, a 
theory can be determinative or probabilistic. A well-developed probabilistic theory will 
give reasons explains the rationale for why certain conditions lead to varied outcomes. 
Waltzian Theory 
Of course, if we were to only listen to Waltz, most schools of IR theory taught 
contemporarily would be considered something else entirely. Neoconservatism would 
certainly not be considered an IR theory. Waltz restricts IR theories to those that derive 
their explanations “at the international, and not at the national, level.”31 Somewhat 
smugly, Waltz comments, “That is why the theory is called a theory of international 
politics,” as opposed to, say, a theory of foreign policy. While I agree with Waltz’ 
definition of IR theory to a point, I disagree with this last point, for if it were to be true, 
IR theories could necessarily only be structural. If this were the case, classical realism 
would not be considered an IR theory. Indeed, in Waltz’ younger days, he argued that 
theories of international politics could come from any of the three ‘images’, and analysis 
                                                
30 Waltz, p. 6. 
31 Waltz, Kenneth Neal. “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy.” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (2007): 54–
57. doi:10.1080/09636419608429298, 54. 
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of only a single image gives a depiction of international relations that is not complete. He 
was originally quite clear about this, saying “the prescriptions directly derived from a 
single image are incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses. The partial 
quality of each image sets up tension that drives one toward inclusion of the other.”32  
IR Theory versus Theories of Foreign Policy 
It is also possible that neoconservatism is really theory of foreign policy and not of 
international relations, as when neoconservatives, particularly Irving Kristol, write of 
relations between states, they constantly remind the reader that they are referring to the 
realm of foreign policy, not of that of international relations theory. Colin Elman defines 
the former as that which “policy makes determinate predictions for dependent variable(s) 
that measure the behavior of individual states.”33 Theories of foreign policy, unlike 
international relations theories, do not predict about aggregate state or system outcomes, 
only the behavior of particular states. Moreover, “a theory of foreign policy explains how 
statesmen act; it does not primarily provide advice as to how they should act.”34 Theories 
of foreign policy are almost always determinate as opposed to probabilistic. 
Interestingly, Elman argues that neorealism can serve as a theory or foreign policy and 
international relations. Because neorealism does make predictions about state behavior 
under certain conditions, it can be used to make foreign policy predictions. For example, 
under Jervis’ security dilemma theory, if states’ intentions cannot be determined, and it is 
                                                
32 Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Revised edition. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 230. 
33 Elman, Colin. “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6, 
no. 1 (2007): 7–53, p. 12. 
34 Elman, p. 16. 
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easier to conquer a state through offensive force than it is to defend oneself, a state is 
more likely to attempt to bandwagon with a superpower than to balance against it.35 If 
these conditions can be observed in the real world, there is nothing that prevents this 
theory from being applied to specific countries, as a theory of foreign policy would. 
Mearsheimer applies his neorealist framework to the relations between modern 
‘superpowers’ and argues that it is inevitable that Russia and the United States will 
balance against an emerging China. Along with Walt, Mearsheimer says that “offshore 
balancing is a realist grand strategy.”36 Ironically, even Waltz, the godfather of structural 
realism, wrote extensively on the subject of nuclear deterrence, speaking about it in both 
abstract and foreign policy terms.37 Strategy in this context is essentially long term 
military foreign policy, and thus it appears that neorealism can be used for foreign policy 
purposes. Furthermore, there have been notable members of the US government to 
implement a realist foreign policy, including former United States Secretary of State and 
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who saw realpolitik as the most effective 
method of foreign policy. Shibley Telhami disagrees with Elman, saying that neorealism 
“does not provide a theory of foreign policy” but can be used “as a framework for further 
inquiry, not as the end of inquiry” for surely material, security and power based factors 
greatly impacts foreign policy decision making.38 To what extent neorealism is a theory 
of foreign policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but if neorealism, probably the most 
                                                
35 Jervis, Robert. “Security Regimes.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 357–78. 
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famous of IR theories, can arguably be applied as both a theory of foreign policy and of 
international relations, then it is possible that neoconservatism could be as well.  
Mid-Level Theory 
Neoconservative IR theory might fall into a category which David Lake calls ‘eclectic, 
mid-level theory.’39 Mid-level theory does not defend “any single set of assumptions, 
[but] builds theories to address specific problems of world politics.”40 In mid-level 
theories, “there are no primordial units of analysis, only methodological ‘bets’ about 
which unit of aggregation is most likely to produce tractable and empirically powerful 
explanations.”41 In way neoconservatism does this, as it originally was a set of ideals 
designed to promote peace through the propagation of American hegemony. 
Neoconservatives themselves would likely view their own ideology as more of a series of 
methodological bets than a concrete IR theory. In this way, neoconservatism somewhat 
resembles the IR theorizing before the rise of the second debate (the debate between 
proponents of behaviorism versus proponents of historicist), many of which refrained 
from limiting themselves to a singular level of analysis. For example, Morgenthau rooted 
much of his analysis of states in human nature, but acknowledged that statesmen had to 
think in a more nuanced way, protecting the national interest irrespective of moralistic 
viewpoints.42 Neoconservatives normally look at states as their units of analysis, but also 
look at statesmen as actors and even human beings at an individual level in general. 
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Furthermore, several aspects of neoconservative IR theory, rather than the whole, might 
be deemed ‘mid-level theory’. Irving Kristol’s theory of deterrence (or rather, his staunch 
opposition to deterrence theory) might fit this criteria. He argues that conventional 
deterrence theory, which holds that states will refrain from attacking a nuclearized state 
conventionally for fear of nuclear retaliation, is flawed because it assumes that a 
government will make the decision to launch a ‘first-strike’ attack without considering 
the public opinion. In the event that country that would be the recipient of the first-strike 
also has nuclear weapons, the public is unlikely to support the use of nuclear weapons, as 
it is likely to suffer when the attacked country launches a ‘second-strike’. This theory is 
designed specifically to address the how nuclear weapons can or cannot prevent 
conventional war and uses more than one level of analysis, making it closer to Lake’s 
mid-level theory than Waltz’ grand structural theory. And, as mentioned previously, 
Waltz himself wrote on nuclear deterrence very much in this way, undermining his own 
claim. 
Combatting Waltzian Conceptions of Theory 
Additionally, whereas Waltz would argue for theory construction to be done in a 
positivist, unbiased manner, Neoconservatism is not only ‘biased’, but openly so. 
Neoconservatives are nearly all American and their writing reflects their intentions to 
make the world a more stable place for their country of origin. Of course, they also argue 
that doing so results in a safer world overall, but that is neither here nor there to 
positivists. Robert Cox, a critical theorist, argues that to theorize in an unbiased manner is 
impossible, for “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” In fact, much of 
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the critiques of the ‘bias’ that neoconservatives unabashedly harbor are projected onto 
neorealists by the likes of Cox. Neorealists are also primarily old, white, American 
intellectuals who seek the maintenance of the status-quo, which conveniently happens to 
situate the United States in a unipolar current reality. And yet, no one, including the 
critical theorists, argues that neorealism is not a theory of international relations as result 
of its bias. Nor should it disqualify neoconservatism, however biased it may be.  
Robert Cox argues that Waltz’, and those who have come to accept his anarchical 
assumptions (like Keohane), conception of international relations is too narrow and too 
readily accepts the Westphalian structure of the world as inherent. He divides 
international relations theories into two strains, problem solving and critical. Problem 
solving theory views the world ‘as it is’ (or at least how it thinks it is) and takes “the 
prevailing social and power relationships...as the given framework for action.”43 Critical 
theory “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls 
them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they 
might be in the process of changing.”44 According to critical theory, the structures and 
assumptions that problem-solving theory assumes as static are put in their historical 
context and assumed to be malleable. Cox’s theory of international relations, Marxist at 
its core, is nearly equally as up front about its intentions- to “allow for normative choice 
in favour of a social political order different from the prevailing order.”45 Much of critical 
theorists’ problem with problem solving theories is that by assuming the structures and 
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institutions in which they analyze are static, they reinforce the permanence of said 
structures and institutions without giving thought to their ability to change. 
Alexander Wendt’s social constructivism is a prime example of this. Wendt firmly puts 
his theory in the problem-solving camp, noting “the ability to shed interesting light on 
concrete problems of world politics must ultimately be the test of a method’s worth.” He 
agrees with Waltz on other assumptions, such as that that international relations needs to 
make aggregate, rather than of specific units, explanations (though he say that IR and 
theories of foreign policy are “complementary rather than competitive”).46 More 
controversially, Wendt says that “constructivism is not a theory of international politics,” 
nor are social theories, because “they do not tell us which actors to study or where they 
are constructed.”47 He argues that ‘social theory’ does count as a theory of international 
relations because it does tell us which actors to study (states) and, though somewhat 
heavy handedly, tells us how they are constructed.  
Ironically, one of the strongest arguments in favor of considering neoconservatism as an 
international relations theory comes from postmodern and critical IR theorists (such as 
Cox), who “refuse to treat the discipline of international relations as a discrete discourse 
with its own rigid intellectual boundaries, distinctive concepts, language, and subject 
matter.”48 In their pursuit of critiquing the ‘conservative’ nature of the IR field, 
postmodern and critical IR theorists ironically opened the door of the ivory tower to 
neoconservatism. 
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Critical theorists have brought to light the deficiencies of problem-solving theories such 
as neorealism and neoliberalism. By evaluating the world for what it is, neorealist and 
neoliberal explanatory models can help to reduce interstate conflict. But relations 
between nations are not limited to wars, nor are wars limited to relations between states. 
After all, much of post-Cold War warfare has come in the form of civil war, which 
neorealism does not do a good job of explaining. Thus, grand theories, such as 
neorealism, while still very useful, are not as grand, or as all-encompassing as they claim 
to be. Nor can they be, for in international relations theory some variables will inevitably 
be ignored for the sake of parsimony. I do believe that a grand theory can theoretically 
exist, but the vast, complex nature of the world leads me to resign to the idea that a true 
grand theory is as real as the platonic forms. To paraphrase Keohane, given the lack of 
empirical data in world politics, you would have to be an idiot to ‘solve’ international 
relations.49 
What we are left with is a smattering of international relations theories that try to either 
explain how states act or try to understand how we conceive particular precepts when 
explaining.50 Neoliberal and neorealism explain how states interact given a set 
international system. Green political theory shows how international relations is 
anthropocentric and argues that there is a ‘limit to growth’ that could lead to conflict and 
environmental crises. Feminist IR theorists critique the gendered language and structures 
of more ‘conventional’ IR theories in order to move the field away from masculine 
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constructs such as militarization and anarchy.51 Marxist IR theory criticized the 
exploitation of the global proletariat at the hands of the global bourgeoisie. And so forth. 
But how much of the world does an IR theory have to either explain or understand? If I 
were to write a theory that says that institutions and state structures are toxic 
manifestations of the bias against the open-boat whaling industry and that these structures 
need to be contextualized and transcended, would this be considered an international 
relations theory? By the standards of critical IR theorists, yes, if the fictitious theory may 
difficult to support. This broadening of the field allows for the possibility of 
neoconservatism to be framed as an international relations theory without restricting it to 
Waltzian or Wendtian rigorousness. 
Criteria for an IR Theory 
Given the increasingly broad nature of current state of international relations theory, what 
then does neoconservatism need to be in order to qualify as an IR theory? First, the 
theories cannot be specific to particular states, otherwise the theory will be of foreign 
policy and not international relations. Rather, the theory should explain the behavior of 
units, institutions, or systems at an aggregate level, or shed light on how we come to 
think about this behavior. Any unit of analysis can be the basis of an IR theory, insofar as 
it directly relates to world politics. This is an important hurdle for neoconservatism, as 
generally its proponents speak only of the foreign policy of the United States. In regards 
to Hollis and Smith’s explaining versus understanding differentialization, I present 
neoconservatism as a theory that does the former. In this fashion, neoconservatism is 
                                                
51 Green theory and feminist theory of international relations are both incredibly varied schools. Examples 
of their supposed ‘purposes’ here are used to represent the variability of IR theory as a field, not to limit 
these theories to the stated purposes above. 
25 
essentially an ontological theory.  As neoconservatives are primarily not academics, they 
are mostly policy makers and journalists, it would not make sense to base a theory of 
neoconservatism around the questioning of epistemology, I do stipulate, though, that – in 
order for international relations to not completely lose meaning – an ontological IR 
theory of it should include the behavior of states in some way. Non-state actors can be the 
unit of analysis, but some of that analysis should include the interaction of non-state 
actors with states. Marxian theories aside, though states are not the only actors in the 
international system, they are the most dominant; any ontological theory that excludes 
them would be mostly useless. 
Second, at a basic level an ontological theory must be a set of ideas explaining how and 
why states or other units interact. This is basically the first part of Cox’ dichotomy, but 
with the caveat that problem-solving theories do not necessarily have to set out to solve 
problems. ‘Problem solving’ is a misnomer for two reasons. First, it denies that critical 
theories can intend to solve problems. Global Ecology has a more direct aim of problem 
solving than neorealism, which considers itself purely positivistic, and yet the latter is 
considered ‘problem solving’ while the former is considered ‘critical’. Cox’s own theory 
is at its core Marxist and posits ways in which globalist structures can be overcome. 
Dividing structural forces in the categories of material capabilities, institutions, or ideas is 
not that much different than Waltz saying that the predominant structural force is 
anarchy. Cox “has not acknowledged the possibility of quasi-critical theories, which may 
have a high degree of reform content short of structural changes.”52 Moreover, Wendt 
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attempts with some success to frame his structural constructivism as just as ‘useful’ in 
explaining the world as neorealism and neoliberalism, theories which would fall under 
the problem solving umbrella. Second, ontological theories seek primarily to explain the 
world, not to solve problems. Waltz’ neorealism seeks to explain the world as it is, not 
for some ulterior motive. Waltz had no problem to solve except for the lack of the 
existence of an IR theory. The potential for overlap between problem solving and critical 
theories results in not having “any criteria for determining whether a given theory is 
problem-solving or critical.”53 
With this in mind, I label ontological theories that fall under the first category as 
‘mechanismic’ and for those under the second category I will maintain Cox’s ‘critical’ 
terminology.54 For mechanismic theories, whether it holds that relationships between 
units are causal or constitutive, are of first level analysis or second, ultimately they must 
explain the behavior of units, why units do what they do. Actions included under this 
conception of international relations theory can result in any or all of a plethora of 
outcomes. War, pollution, colonialism, genocide, a patriarchal world system, it doesn't 
matter really. But some behavior within the realm of world politics must be explained. 
Neoconservatism is fairly straightforward; at its most basic level it evaluates the 
probability of war based on assumptions it shares with the democratic peace theory. I will 
more thoroughly address this in chapter three. 
Finally, the theory’s mechanisms should, in the words of Andrew Moravcsik, 
“demonstrate empirical accuracy vis à vis other theories; it should expose anomalies in 
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existing work, forcing reconsideration of empirical findings and theoretical positions.”55 
While this may seem restrictive and overly behaviorist, it allows me to compare 
neoconservatism to most of the leading ontological international relations theories (again, 
Marxianism aside). To quote Waltz, “a theory is made credible only in proportion to the 
variety and difficulty of the tests,” though at the same time “no theory can ever be proved 
true.”56 Empirical accuracy is important because without it we would be left with many 
theories that have no particular amount of truth than the other, as one can “find evidence 
to support almost any interpretation in an author who writes profoundly and at length 
about complicated matters.”57 With this said, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
actually do this rigorous testing; I will leave this to future neoconservatives. 
The field of international relations is broader than it ever has been before. The impact of 
critical theorists allows for a broader range of ideologies, including neoconservatism, to 
be considered an IR theory. Even though neoconservatism doesn’t meet Waltz’s 
definition of theory, not many theories do, including arguably Waltz’s own theory. Using 
my broader definition of theory we can earnestly judge the merits of neoconservatism as 
an international relations theory.
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Chapter 3: A Brief History of Neoconservatism 
To fully understand neoconservatism in the context of international relations theory, it is 
imperative that neoconservatism be put into historical context. Where did the 
neoconservatives come from? When did neoconservatism as a term first come to be used? 
Though the developers of neoconservatism initially focused on domestic politics before 
eventually becoming critics of leftist social engineering, they continuously held strict 
anti-communist views. Though anti-communism was certainly far from unique in the 
United States in the 1940s and 1950s, the neoconservatives’ anti-communism it is worth 
noting because of the metamorphosis from anti-communism to anti-authoritarianism that 
eventually became the focal point of neoconservative foreign policy. Moreover, anti-
communism served to establish several other ideological stances of neoconservatives, 
such as skepticism of international organizations and belief in the necessity of a robust 
military.  
For the purposes of clarity, I will use the ex post facto term proto-neoconservative to 
categorize the students, writers, and academics who would at some point become 
neoconservatives, though ideologically they at most only vaguely resemble their future 
selves, at least at first. 
From Trotskyism to the “Vital Center” 
However you wish to categorize neoconservatism, it is generally agreed that its seeds 
were planted in alcove number 1 of the dining hall of the City College of New York 
(CCNY) in West Harlem. Anti-communist in the late 1930s even before the Red Scare a 
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decade later, the CCNY students distrusted the Soviet Union and what it stood for, not 
out of nationalistic pride or right-wing scaremongering, but because they were anti-
Stalin. The students of alcove number 1, including Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Daniel Bell and Nathaniel Glazer, were sympathetic to Marxism but could not stand to 
“justify the Moscow trials and the bloody purge of old Bolsheviks,...accept the self-
glorification of Joseph Stalin as an exemplar of Communist virtue and wisdom,…[and] 
deny that there were concentration camps in the Soviet Union,”58 while the far more 
numerous students of the pro-Stalinist camp could.  
Though Kristol would admit that while at CCNY “very little did happen” in terms of 
substantial impact on the greater college community, most chronologies of 
neoconservatism conclude that the CCNY chapter of the proto-neoconservative brood 
was important for two reasons. First, it instilled in the group a firm belief in anti-
communism. Though ideologically not far from communists (the students of alcove 
number 1 were avid readers of the Partisan Review), the disturbing actualities of Soviet 
communism stuck with the proto-neoconservatives through their various ideological 
transformations. Second, the great promise and great failure of communism, and the 
proto-neoconservatives’ turn away from it, is representative of the future turns rightward 
that they would have throughout their careers. In a sense, the proto-neoconservatives did 
not move away from communism out of action but out of reaction, which too will be a 
similar theme in their ideological history. 
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As World War II passed, proto-neoconservatives drifted rightward, coming to be a part of 
what Arthur Schlesinger called the “vital center” of liberalism.59 Many were members of 
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a political organization which sought to 
promote the continuation of New Deal programs, support democratic candidates, and 
fight communism. Unlike the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), a more leftist 
group which the ADA struggled with for influence in the Democratic Party, the ADA 
supported the Truman Doctrine, including $400 million in economic and military aid to 
Greece and Turkey, and the Marshall Plan. Aid packages were promoted both for 
humanitarian reasons and as a buttress against communist advances. 
Proto-neoconservatives expressed their anti-communism in different ways. Kristol 
believed that pro-communist speech need not be protected, as communism for him was “a 
movement guided by conspiracy and aiming at totalitarianism, rather than merely another 
form of ‘dissent’ or ‘nonconformity.’” Rather than combatting McCarthy with the false 
dichotomy of “complete civil liberties for everyone and a disregard for civil liberties 
entirely,” Kristol thought that liberals should push for something closer in degree to the 
former, while also denouncing communism absolutely. Just as it would have been 
ridiculous to defend pro-Nazi speech in the 1930s, the same was true of pro-communism 
in the 1950s. For Kristol, “There is a false pride, by which liberals persuade themselves 
that no matter what association a man has had with a Communist enterprise, he is 
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absolutely guiltless of the crimes that Communism has committed so long as he was 
moved to this association by a generous idealism.”60 
Others in the “vital center” thought this to be a dangerous proposition, for any violation 
of freedom of speech and association rights would set a dubious precedent. Nathan 
Glazer said that “it is a shame and an outrage that Senator McCarthy should remain in the 
Senate” and that McCarthy “has undoubtedly damaged the effectiveness of government 
agencies carrying important responsibilities in the fight against Communism,” though he 
believed American institutions would prevent any long term damage to civil liberties. 
Seymour Martin Lipset viewed McCarthy as a populist who represented the “radical 
right.”61 
Kristol co-founded (with covert CIA funding) the London-based magazine Encounter in 
order to promote center-left positions as a positive alternative to communism. Though the 
funding would eventually raise controversy, Kristol used Encounter as a platform to 
spread his anti-communist, pro-liberal message to a larger audience. For instance, he 
wrote that: 
Liberals ought to be concerned with all ‘changes and reforms tending in the 
direction of democracy.’ But it is a fact that Communism today rules one-third of 
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the human race, and may soon rule more; and that it is the most powerful existing 
institution which opposes such changes and reforms as liberalism proposes.62  
Kristol himself actually at this time had foreign policy views that slightly differed than 
those of his later self. For instance, with a tip of the hat to the United Nations he wrote 
that “no one thinks it at all strange that scholars should devise plans for universal peace 
on the assumption that mankind will remain as belligerent as ever” for to “achieve ideals 
without [the] benefit of idealism or idealists is so fundamental an aspect of social theory 
in our epoch.”63 
Reaction to New Left 
Neoconservatism did not come into its own until the late 1960s, however. This time, 
neoconservatives like Bell and Kristol moved steadily away from the center-left and 
towards the center-right, all the while remaining staunchly anti-communist. 
Neoconservatism developed in part as an opposition to the New Left, which broadly 
included, amongst other groups, the Students for a Democratic Society, the Free Speech 
Movement, and the Congress on Racial Equality. These groups believed that racial 
equality and women’s liberation should be prioritized over the economic struggle of the 
(mostly white) lower-middle class, which was primarily represented by the AFL-CIO. 
The New Left was more in favor of government intervention than the AFL-CIO, which 
tended to appreciate government support but did not want to over-rely on it to achieve 
gains that could otherwise be achieved through worker-employer negotiations. The New 
Left was unsatisfied with this tactic, seeing it as slow and limited in scope. Viewing the 
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working class as “indoctrinated and apathetic,” social change should be initiated by 
student and African-American groups. The Port Huron statement, the SDS’ political 
manifesto, proclaimed that “Any new left in America must be, in large measure, a left 
with real intellectual skills, committed to deliberativeness, honesty, reflection as working 
tools.”64 
The proto-neoconservatives saw the New Left as a threat for three reasons. First, they 
found the New Left’s radicalism to be a cannibalization of the lower-middle classes and 
their struggle for incremental wage increases, better workplace conditions, and job 
stability. Second, they thought this lurch leftwards would alienate southern blue-collar 
Democrats and lead to electoral losses to Republicans due to their seeming abandonment. 
While obviously the proto-neoconservatives were in favor of the expansion of civil 
rights, they thought that demand for immediate results would be counterproductive. 
Better instead would have it been to elect the likes of Lyndon Johnson who, if not the 
most progressive, could at least win. In effect they were right, at least electorally. Most 
notably, center-left Governor Pat Brown of California, having finagled the 1965 Watts 
riots, lost his reelection campaign in 1966 to ‘law and order’ candidate Ronald Reagan. In 
1972, President Richard Nixon defeated leftist candidate George McGovern by 22 
percentage points; McGovern only won one state, Massachusetts. 
Third, the New Left was in favor of a defense spending rollback, critical of the military 
and, most importantly, not anti-communist. Proto-neoconservatives, seeing military 
spending necessary for deterrence vis à vis the Soviet Union, saw SDS leader Tom 
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Hayden’s foreign policy stance, that “the proclaimed peaceful intentions of the United 
States contradicted its economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo,” as 
both false and naïve.65 During the heart of the Vietnam War protests, Irving Kristol wrote 
that “the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the Truman doctrine, foreign aid, NATO, 
Korea, Viet Nam--these were all elements in a grand design for a world where each 
nation would be persuaded, shamed, coerced, and bribed to observe the civilities essential 
to a decent international community.”66 He admitted that this statement was more than a 
little hypocritical, for at the time all of these foreign policy maneuvers combined to form 
a “convenient cover for national self-centredness.”67 Nevertheless, for the proto-
neoconservatives it needn't had to be. The answer to the problem of Vietnam was not a 
return to pre-World War II isolationism nor was it to celebrate the likes of Castro, Arafat, 
and Nasser merely because they were supposedly anti-imperialist, but to continue to 
combat communism and its supporters because of the inherit threats it posed to 
democracy. 
Neoconservatism and the ‘Jewish Connection’ 
In the midst of the rise of the New Left the Six Day War erupted, deeply impacting the 
ideological development of proto-neoconservatives. Though not all neoconservatives 
were Jewish, a great number including Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer, 
Seymour Martin Lipset, and Daniel Bell were. Later neoconservatives like Elliot Abrams, 
Richard Perle, Robert and Frederick Kagan, Max Boot, Paul Wolfowitz, Bret Stephens, 
and David Brooks are also Jewish. The “Jewish connection” amongst the earlier 
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neoconservatives in particular is neither merely coincidental nor a grand conspiracy; 
much of it has to do with their origin at CCNY and the generally large representation of 
Jews on the left, radical or not.  
The “Jewishness” of the neoconservative movement is important for two reasons, both 
involving their views of Israel. First, the Six Day War drove a wedge between Jews and 
the New Left. Not all American Jews at the time supported Israel,68 but the proto-
neoconservatives certainly did. Indeed, on the second day of the Six Day War Kristol, 
Podhoretz, Bell, Glazer, and Lipset all signed a petition published in the New York 
Times69 asking President Johnson to not “let Israel perish” and instead “act to assure its 
survival and to secure, legality, morality and peace in the area” by providing “freedom of 
passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, a right which is indispensable 
to Israel’s existence.”70 In return many members of the New Left expressed their support 
for the PLO and the coalition of Arab states. Equating Zionism with racism and 
imperialism, the New Left and in particular black militants denounced Israeli occupation, 
with rhetoric that sometimes delved into anti-Semitism.  
In spite of their Jewish background, neoconservatives would likely have supported Israel 
regardless of religious bent. Both Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. 
ambassadors to the United Nations under Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, respectively, 
strongly advocated for Israel, were neoconservative, but not Jewish. At the same time, to 
say that there is no relation with the Jewishness of the neoconservative movement and its 
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affinity to Israel is difficult. Commentary Magazine, which published some of the most 
prominent articles in defense of Israel during the 1970s, was founded by the American 
Jewish Committee. Two of Commentary’s goals are “to maintain, sustain, and cultivate 
the future of the Jewish people” and “to bear witness against anti-Semitism and defend 
Zionism and the State of Israel.”71  
And yet, the charge put upon neoconservatives that their allegiances lie closer to 
Jerusalem than Washington, as posited numerous times by Pat Buchanan, and more 
recently by Joe Klein72 and Greenwald,73 is not so much anti-Semitic as it is irrelevant.74 
Neoconservatives, Jews and non-Jews alike, back Israel because they believe Israel to be 
a two-folded embodiment of the neoconservative foreign policy ethos. That is, 
neoconservatives believe supporting Israel to be in the best interest of the United States 
both for security reasons and because it has been regarded (albeit controversially) as the 
only democracy in the Middle East. For instance, Boot writes that the neoconservatives’ 
commitment to Israel is “a commitment based not on shared religion or ethnicity but on 
shared liberal democratic values.”75 During the Cold War, an alliance with Israel was 
seen as a balancing force against the Soviet Union and their proxies in the Middle East. 
Today, the United States’ alliance with Israel is done to support a fellow democracy. 
William Kristol writes that Israel’s part in the 2006 Lebanon War was a part of a broader 
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Islamist “attack” on “liberal democratic civilization.”76 Thus, even if Jewish 
neoconservatives had dual-loyalty with both Israel and the U.S., neoconservatives argue 
that the opposite is worse: reduced support for Israel is a detriment to the United States. 
Support for Israel also helped to develop the neoconservatives’ distrust of the United 
Nations and autocracies. Moynihan famously denounced before the United Nations that 
resolution 3379, which determined “that Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination,”77 to be a “lie” that would result in “grave and perhaps irreparable 
harm...to the cause of human rights.”78 While the United Nations was supposed to be a 
force of justice and stability, its democratic nature had led it to be hijacked by 
undemocratic regimes. In their eyes, what right did Cuba, Libya, and Kampuchea have to 
make moralistic decrees, particularly at the expense of a democracy? Moynihan saw the 
“passing [of] the resolution meant that the lunatics were taking over the asylum,”79 and 
even if the General Assembly could send no armies, it deserved to be denounced. 
Outside of support for Israel, which I have demonstrated to not exclusive to Jewish 
neoconservatives, the Jewish background of the majority of neoconservatives is more of a 
conspiratorial trope for those on the far left and far right than an actual determining 
characteristic. At most, the Jewishness of neoconservatives was a mutual unifying 
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characteristic of the proto-neoconservatives, but the same can be said of the relative 
poverty, as most early neoconservatives were born fairly poor, including those non-
Jewish, like Moynihan. Besides, neoconservatives and their distaste for quotas are the 
first to denounce supposed ‘identity politics.’ To peg the shortcomings of 
neoconservatism on their collective Jewishness seems intellectually lazy. 
Historiography of Neoconservatism 
The actual date of the adoption of the term “neoconservatism” is a matter of dispute. 
Seymour Martin Lipset claims that neoconservatism was coined by Michael Harrington, 
leader of the Democratic Socialists, “in order to discredit the right wing of the dissolved 
party, Social Democrats USA, and their intellectual fellow travelers.”80 Lipset saw this as 
an example of what sociologists call “labelling”. Without the label of neoconservative, 
the right wing of the liberal movement would not have been shunned by the left wing nor 
would have it been courted by the editors of the conservative National Review. The label 
“quickly took hold and became part of the American political discourse” and led to a 
confusion over the neoconservatives’ true ideological standpoint.81 For example, many in 
the United States and elsewhere assumed that “neoconservatives were hard-line right-
wingers on domestic as well as foreign issues, whereas in fact almost all of them 
remained supportive of [the] welfare planning state and New Deal policies.”82 Though 
Norman Podhoretz and to a lesser extent Irving Kristol did eventually break from the 
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Democratic party, others like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer remained 
Democrats their entire lives. 
Harrington for his part denies Lipset’s claim, saying that it was commonly used amongst 
his fellow editors at Dissent magazine years before he first used the term in his 1973 
article “The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics”, published in Dissent. Justin 
Vaïsse of the Brookings Institution formulated three potential hypotheses for the “birth of 
neoconservatism”: 1965, the year Kristol and Bell first published The Public Interest; 
1967, both the year The Public Interest first published articles demonizing the welfare 
state and the year of the Six Day War; or 1970, when Norman Podhoretz shifted the 
editorial stance of Commentary from generally liberal to unmistakably neoconservative. 
Harrington’s article was the first of its kind that I could find, but ultimately there cannot 
be one date of the founding of neoconservatism. As a movement, unlike a political party, 
neoconservatism has no charter, no mission statement, and no chairman. But the ideas of 
neoconservatism certainly existed in a concrete form in 1967, and they didn’t change 
until at least the 1980s. 
Shift to Foreign Policy 
By the 1970s, the neoconservatives had transitioned away from domestic policy towards 
foreign policy. The New Left was less relevant and under Nixon so too were debates on 
domestic policy. Norman Podhoretz moved Commentary to focus more on foreign policy, 
serving as a mouthpiece for Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick. Most prominent, 
neoconservatives rallied around Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a democratic Senator from 
Washington State. Jackson was firmly pro-Israel and anti-détente. Most notable during 
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his six terms in the Senate was the passing of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade 
Act of 1974. The Trade Act was supposed be a landmark step towards achieving détente 
with the Soviet bloc because it would have open up Soviet markets and create trade 
linkages. Jackson was against the bill for three reasons. First, he saw trade with the Soviet 
Union, and détente more broadly, as a threat to the United States. Jackson wanted the 
Soviet Union to fall, not be propped up by outside American technology. Second, 
Jackson was a strong supporter of unions, most of which were against the bill for it would 
open up U.S. manufacturing to competition from the Soviets. Third, he thought that the 
bill let the Soviet Union off easy in respect to human rights; it should not be rewarded 
for, say, denying its citizens the right to immigrate to Israel. The amendment thus denied 
most favored nation status to nations that “[denied] its citizens the right or opportunity to 
emigrate.”83 When the Soviet Union could not meet an immigration quota of Russian 
Jews to Israel satisfactory for Jackson (100,000 per year), the Trade Act lost most of its 
usefulness.  
Jackson’s influence and the foreign policy ideals of neoconservatives are quite evident in 
the 1976 Democratic Party platform. With the help of Richard Perle, Ben Wattenberg 
pledged the Democrats support for human rights, military strength, distrust of 
authoritarianism, and the necessity of military strength. It denounced the Republicans for 
giving “a greater concern for our relations with totalitarian adversaries than with our 
democratic allies.” In seeking to preserve the status quo, the Ford and Nixon 
administrations possessed a “self-fulfilling pessimism that contradicts a traditional 
American belief in the possibility of human progress.” It even threw a direct jab at 
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Kissinger’s realism, calling it a “balance-of-power diplomacy suited better to the last 
century than to this one.”84 
Unfortunately for the neoconservatives, they could not parlay Jackson’s success against 
détente into gains in the executive branch. Jackson unsuccessfully ran for president in 
1972 and 1976. His defeat at the hands of Jimmy Carter in 1976 became something of an 
inflection point for the relationship between neoconservatives and the Democratic Party. 
Carter was not initially viewed poorly by neoconservatives, but he quickly lost favor with 
them. No neoconservatives were included in cabinet; the only neoconservatives to get 
appointed a position at all were James Woolsey as undersecretary to the Navy, Max 
Kappelman as ambassador to the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe, and 
Peter Rosenblatt as ambassador to Micronesia. Woolsey eventually resigned in protest of 
his “inadequate budget.”85 Neoconservatives charged Carter with being a dove. They 
denounced the Salt II talks out of distrust of the Soviets and the selling of F-16s to Saudi 
Arabia out of fear for Israel. At one point Carter held a breakfast in the White House with 
several prominent neoconservatives, including Wattenburg, Kirkpatrick, Abrams, and 
Podhoretz in order to secure their support in the 1980 election. It did not go well. Carter 
was defensive and according to Abrams “far from meeting [the] group halfway or 
indicating that he cared whether this group stayed Democrats, he basically indicated that 
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he did not give a goddamn.”86 Kirkpatrick stormed out of the meeting and upon exiting 
told the awaiting press that she would vote for Reagan. 
The meeting marked the conversion of the majority, but not all, of neoconservatives to 
the Republican Party.  Richard Perle was named assistant secretary of defense for 
international security policy. Elliot Abrams became assistant secretary of state for 
international organizations. Kirkpatrick became Reagan’s ambassador to the United 
Nations. Wolfowitz was made Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. Kappelman remained ambassador to the Conference on Security Cooperation in 
Europe. Kristol founded The National Interest, which quickly overtook Podhoretz’ 
Commentary as the preeminent publication of neoconservative thought.  
The democratic neoconservatives dwindled and were marginalized from the greater 
movement. Scoop Jackson died in 1983. Moynihan had been elected as senator to New 
York in 1976 as a democrat; he would maintain both position and party until his 
retirement in 2001.87 Having to compete in democratic primaries, Moynihan actually 
drifted leftward in comparison to the neoconservatives, by which time were on board 
with Reaganomics. Glazer and Bell remained Democrats, but were seen as too far right 
for most democrats. Regardless, Reagan and later George H.W. Bush dominated 
electorally, with Reagan carrying 49 states and Bush 40. 
The next generation of neoconservatives were uniformly Republican. Not having the 
Trotskyist or even liberal origin of their forefathers (and in the case of William Kristol 
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and John Podhoretz, literal fathers), the ‘neocons’ had no reason to attach themselves to 
the Democratic Party, nor did their more free-market economics make the Democratic 
Party a viable option. The Weekly Standard, co-founded by William Kristol, became the 
neoconservatives’ preferred publication.  
The most distinguishing characteristic of the neocons from prior neoconservatives is their 
unabashed defense of democracy and enthusiasm for intervention. No longer was 
democracy promotion viewed as an extension of containment and balancing against the 
Soviet Union, but became important for its own sake. In this aspect the neocons 
understood neoconservatism more than the like of Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer. That 
is, neoconservatism had always been inherently ideological. Irving Kristol did not oppose 
the Soviet Union because of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal, or because Stalin was particularly 
brutal, but because he thought that communism was inherently expansionist and, given 
the brutality, disrespect for human rights and failed economic policy, was therefore a 
threat to the United States. Kristol88 brushed aside Liberia’s fall at the hands of Charles 
Taylor, saying “if the Soviets (or the Chinese or even the Cubans) were involved, I’d 
know what to think, since we would be then be confronting a challenge.”89 
The Bush Administration 
No history, however brief, of neoconservatism can be complete without a mention of the 
George W. Bush administration, which the neoconservatives relationship with is still 
subject to an almost conspiratorial tone. To be clear, George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and 
Donald Rumsfeld were not neoconservatives nor had any of the three even been 
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considered as neoconservatives before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Bush in particular 
embraced neoconservative idealistic rhetoric during his two terms as president. Neither 
had the ideological underpinnings that actual neoconservatives had developed over the 
preceding decades. In fact, the Bush/Cheney campaign was highly critical of Clinton and 
his foreign policy in the lead-ups to the 2000 election, particularly his bombing of Serbia 
during the Kosovo War. To be sure, Bush and Cheney did employ several 
neoconservatives in high positions, such as Paul Wolfowitz as deputy Secretary of 
Defense, Douglas Feith a rung below him, and Elliot Abrams as senior director at the 
National Secretary Council. They were countered though by genuine realists in 
Condoleezza Rice as National Security advisor and Colin Powell as Secretary of State. 
The obvious manifestation of neoconservative thinking in the Bush administration was 
the Iraq War. The war checked off nearly every neoconservative position on foreign 
policy. It was primarily an expression of the democratic peace and a distrust of 
autocracies, especially one that already had a track record of attempted conquest. For Bill 
Kristol and Robert Kagan, the outcomes of the Iraq war lay in the dichotomy of 
democracy versus authoritarianism. He wrote whether the U.S. would create a “world 
order conducive to our liberal democratic principles and our safety, or it will be one 
where brutal, well-armed tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international 
security hostage?”90 The initial coalition of fighting force, with the exception of the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, was made up entirely of democracies. The war confirmed the 
distrust of the United Nations – which did not authorize the U.S.’ invasion – that many 
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neoconservatives shared. Iraq was seen as a threat to Israel; Baghdad had launched 
missiles at Israel in the Kuwait War despite Israel’s deliberate lack of participation in the 
fighting.91 Finally, the war was viewed by neoconservatives as a defense of human rights, 
given Saddam’s brutal killing of Kurds and suppression of Iraq’s Shia majority. 
Neoconservatives were extremely confident, bordering on overconfident, in the days 
before to the Iraq War. For Kristol and Kagan, fighting in both Afghanistan and Iraq 
would be like being able to “walk and chew gum at the same time.” Neoconservatives 
had built up democracy to be a magic wand, but ignored the importance of regional 
expertise, assuming all democratic transitions to be as those in Eastern Europe.  They 
erroneously assumed that American liberators would be greeted in open arms by Iraqis, 
ignoring the negative reputation the U.S. military had accrued since Vietnam. Above all, 
neoconservatives surmised that any alternative would be better than Saddam’s tyranny. 
Kristol and Kagan wrote that:  
It is almost impossible to imagine any outcome for the world both plausible and 
worse than the disease of Saddam with weapons of mass destruction. A fractured 
Iraq? An unsettled Kurdish situation? A difficult transition in Baghdad? These 
may be problems, but they are far preferable to leaving Saddam in power with his 
nukes, VX, and anthrax.92 
At the same time, it would be disingenuous to entirely put blame on the neoconservatives 
for the disastrous war that followed. Bill Kristol in particular understood that nation 
building was a prerequisite to a successful democratic transition in Iraq, something that 
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Donald Rumsfeld failed to grasp. Along with Robert Kagan, Kristol wrote that “the best 
way to avoid chaos and anarchy in Iraq after Saddam is removed is to have a powerful 
American occupying force in place, with the clear intention of sticking around for a 
while.” Nation building would prevent a “vacuum of power” while also deterring Iranian 
meddling through proxies.93 
The haughtiness and utter failure of the neoconservatives largely discredited them in the 
eyes of both the American people and foreign policymakers, at least for a time. It seems 
unlikely though that neoconservative influence will go anywhere. Though they were not 
the first to do so, neoconservatives have successfully implanted idealism into any U.S. 
foreign policy debate, even if ‘interest’ sometimes wins out. And even though it may be 
only rhetoric, democratic values have become a driving factor in U.S. foreign policy and 
certainly will remain so. 
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Chapter 4: Basic Assumptions of Neoconservative IR 
Given that neoconservatism does not have a manifesto of formation or any formal unified 
set of ideology, from where does neoconservatism derive its theoretical basis? While 
anticommunism is what brought neoconservatives together, the antithetical rejection of 
an ideology cannot serve as the basis of an international relations theory by itself. Instead, 
I contend in this chapter that neoconservatism as an international relations theory is based 
upon assumptions derived from the monadic version of democratic peace theory. More 
pointedly, neoconservatives assume that regime type matters, that democracies are more 
peaceful than autocracies both because of democratic institutional restraints (and the lack 
thereof in autocracies) and liberal norms inherent in democracies. Using the monadic 
democratic peace theory as a starting point, neoconservatives (most of whom would be 
classified as neocons) predict state behavior based on Waltz’s second level of analysis, 
the state, though at times they apply the same logic to predict state behavior based on 
individual actors. In this way neoconservatism falls to a large extent within the liberal 
camp of international relations theory. This chapter will also reject other possible bases 
for neoconservative IR theory. Specifically, it dismisses claims dealing with the 
connection of neoconservatives to the philosopher Leo Strauss. 
Dismissing Straussian Based Theories of Neoconservatism 
Because of the sheer volume of works concerning the influence of German-American 
philosopher Leo Strauss on neoconservatism, including neoconservatism and 
international relations, it is necessary to explain why there is in fact little of substance 
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linking Strauss to neoconservative international relations.94 While an argument can be 
made that Strauss affected some aspects of earlier neoconservatives’ views on capitalism, 
the philosophy of Leo Strauss makes for a poor theoretical basis for a neoconservative 
international relations theory, for three primary reasons. 
First, the most founded attempts to connect Leo Strauss to neoconservatism only deal 
with domestic policy. Some of these connections are actually quite concrete. For 
example, Strauss was distrustful of liberalism because it inevitably led to cultural 
relativism, eroding truth and leading to nihilism. Irving Kristol similarly thought that 
despite its efficiency and benefits to society, capitalism similarly leads to nihilism 
because it erodes the belief in anything greater than an ever-expanding material 
appetite.95 But it is difficult to relate this to international relations in a direct manner. 
The second problem with those who have used Strauss as a basis for explaining 
neoconservative international politics is that of the works that have dealt with foreign 
policy, all are limited in scope. After the Iraq War, Drury relates Strauss’ conception of 
‘the noble lie’ to the Bush administration’s lies about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of 
mass destruction. For Strauss, in the absence of truth, a false truth needs to be instituted 
in order to satisfy the masses. Drury says that “the trouble with the Straussians is that 
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they are compulsive liars.”96 But even if we are to believe that the blame for Colin 
Powell’s United Nations speech stems from Strauss, the idea of ‘the noble lie’ only 
relates to a specific policy, specifically the Iraq War. It cannot be the basis for a larger 
theory. Similarly, Norton talks of the neoconservatives’ supposed wanting of an 
American empire, but does not relate it back to Strauss,97 while Hirst draws upon Strauss’ 
nihilism and relates it to Wolfowitz’ changes of intelligence procedures, the 
neoconservatives’ use of the word ‘regime’ to describe Iraq, and neoconservatives’ 
manipulation of public opinion.98 These too are only useful in an analysis of the Iraq War 
and cannot be used to form a greater theory. 
Third, and most importantly, it is difficult to ascribe the philosophy behind 
neoconservatism to Leo Strauss because there is no significant evidence that any more 
than a minority of neoconservatives have even read Strauss, let alone would consider 
themselves as Straussians. When scholars have used Strauss to explain the actions of 
neoconservatives, at best they have projected the ideology of Strauss onto the actions and 
writings of the few neoconservatives that either briefly studied with Strauss or one of 
Strauss’ students. Shadia Drury exclusively uses Irving Kristol for source material. Hirst 
is limited to William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, and other less prominent neoconservatives 
like Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky. Norton provides a longer list of Straussians, but 
cannot prove the extent to which Strauss’ thoughts have influenced their work. In 
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actuality, few neoconservatives studied with Strauss, the most notable of which was 
Wolfowitz, who took two undergraduate classes with him. 
Ultimately, supposed neoconservative Straussians find the connection between 
neoconservative foreign policy and Strauss to be unfounded. William Kristol writes that 
“it would be misleading to attempt to understand Strauss by ascribing to him an 
influence, whether beneficial or nefarious, on current policy debates, and then inferring 
from the alleged influence what his aims really were.”99  Robert Kagan and Richard Perle 
“say their views have nothing to do with Strauss” while Wolfowitz asks why anyone 
would “need an obscure political philosopher to understand that it makes a difference 
what kind of regime rules Iraq?”100 As such, the philosophy of Leo Strauss should not be 
used as a basis of neoconservative international relations theory. 
A Better Basis: The Democratic Peace Theory 
Unlike a connection to Leo Strauss, there is evidence that neoconservatives derive some 
their basic assumptions from the monadic democratic peace theory. A few prominent 
neoconservatives directly reference the monadic democratic peace theory and Kant, while 
others explain its underlying logic without directly referencing Kant, but whose ideas are 
in essence the same as Kant’s. Others still say more simply that democracies are 
inherently more benevolent than autocracies, indicating that they were directly influenced 
monadic democratic peace theory. 
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The evidence of this derivation is substantial. Former Wall Street Journal and current 
New York Times editorial board member Bret Stephens, a neoconservative himself, 
contends that “neoconservatives generally take the view that the internal character of a 
regime usually predicts the nature of its foreign policy.”101 Paul Wolfowitz agrees, saying 
that “ignoring the nature of states is to ignore a fundamental reality” for “the internal 
makeup of states has a huge effect on their external behavior.”102 Max Boot, assessing 
George W.  Bush’s National Security Strategy 68, says that “the strategy is so emphatic 
because the administration embraces the theory of a ‘democratic peace’ — the notion that 
liberal democracies are unlikely to use weapons of mass destruction, sponsor terrorism, 
and undertake other activities that threaten their neighbors.”103 
This is unlike the view of most contemporary scholars of the democratic peace, who 
argue not that democracies are inherently more peaceful, but instead that mature 
democracies are not likely to fight with each other.104 This distinction is important 
because neoconservatives, unlike Doyleian liberals, believe not only democracies are 
inherently peaceful, but also that autocratic regimes are more likely to be belligerent. 
Doyle, on the other hand, writes that “we cannot simply blame warfare on the 
authoritarians and totalitarians, as many of our politicians would have us do” because 
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“most wars arise out of calculations and of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual 
suspicions.”105 Neoconservatives reject this claim, mainly blaming conflict on non-
democratic regimes. Democracies do not display what David Hume calls “international 
imprudence”106; instead they often lament that democracies do not better prepare 
themselves for threats from non-democracies. Joshua Muravchik is quick to reject 
standard liberal assessments of the democratic peace, such as those done by Doyle or 
Bruce Russert, who argue that the democratic peace is only dyadic and not monadic, 
saying 
The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question 
of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively 
measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two 
states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. 
Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see 
them as prey or underestimate their resolve.107 
Neoconservatives do also hold the dyadic democratic peace treaty, which is “the claim 
that democracies rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-
let-live and domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war,”108 to be true. Kaplan 
and William Kristol, in arguing for regime change in Iraq, for instance, state that 
“democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another” to be a “truth of international 
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politics.”109 However, the monadic version is emphasized more because of its stronger 
causal linkages and because it is a loftier claim. That is, neoconservatives derive their 
explanation for the dyadic democratic peace theory from its Kantian sibling; if 
democracies are more peaceful, of course they would rarely fight one another. 
The neoconservative conception of the monadic democratic peace theory claims that 
democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, mirroring the ideas of the democratic 
peace first developed by Immanuel Kant. Stephens claims that “governments that are 
answerable to their own people and accountable to a rule of law tend to respect the rights 
of their neighbors, honor their treaty commitments, and abide by the international rules of 
the road.”110 For neoconservatives, “democracies are inherently more friendly..., less 
belligerent to their neighbors, and generally more inclined to peace.”111 In essence, 
democracies are more likely to respect and uphold liberal values and take a more 
internationalist view of the world, working towards economic and political cooperation 
based on shared long-term interests. Neoconservatives also claim that the opposite is true, 
that “regimes that prey on their own citizens are likely to prey on their neighbors as 
well.”112 It is for this reason, neoconservatives claim, that they were fearful and 
suspicious of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Ayatollah Khamenei’s Iran, and now Putin’s 
Russia. As such, instead of defining national interest purely in Morganthauian terms, 
neoconservatives also emphasize the prevalence of a government’s values defining its 
national interest. 
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It is important to note that neoconservatives generally do not go into detail on their 
definition of democracy. Though some autocracies are obviously more threatening than 
others, a mature democracy is not more benign than a developing democracy; they are 
equally pacifist. They not make distinctions between democracies and partial 
democracies, or hybrid regimes. For their analytical purposes, a country can only be a 
democracy or not. And though Kant originally referred to republics, not democracies, 
neoconservatives use the terms interchangeably. 
Neoconservatives give four primary reasons in arguing that democracies are more 
peaceful than autocracies. First, the ways in which autocrats maintain their power also 
makes them less conductive to peaceful action. Dictators still need to appeal to their 
citizens; they still need to appear legitimate. Seymour Martin Lipset (being quoted by 
Elliot Abrams) defines legitimacy as “the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper 
ones for the society.”113 In order to achieve this, autocratic regimes can use domestic or 
international tools. Domestically, a strong and growing economy, robust public services, 
and high wages can sometimes cause the populace to ignore their a lack of civil liberties. 
But, if an autocrat were to see its power base decrease domestically and realize 
diminishing returns on repression, it may pivot to using an aggressive foreign policy to 
build legitimacy at home; ‘wagging the dog,’ so to speak. An effective way to project 
power domestically is to implement that power onto others. Because authoritarian states 
are “unable to acquire legitimacy through the consent of their own oppressed citizens, 
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such states seek the more superficial authority that comes from demonizing an external 
enemy.”114 This kind of aggressive foreign policy drums up nationalism and can unify a 
populace against an external (real or imaginary) threat. 
Putin’s Russia is a good example of an autocrat using war to obtain support, intervening 
in Crimea and Syria in order to make the regime look strong despite a feeble economy. 
The interventions have also marginalized opposition groups, because “Duma parties do 
not dissent from the Kremlin foreign policy consensus except in a more hard-line 
direction,” making Putin seem more legitimate.115 Putin’s approval rating jumped from 
60 percent in 2012 to 84 percent in 2014, as “the annexation of Crimea appears to have 
overshadowed any negative developments of the past 15 years.”116 Ross Munro argues 
that China is doing likewise, as “the PRC elite is turning increasingly to a chauvinist and 
expansionist version of Chinese nationalism in its efforts to hold onto power.”117 North 
Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs can similarly be viewed as examples of tapping into 
national pride to give legitimacy to their regimes. 
Second, neoconservatives echo Kant in arguing that it is irrational for citizens to vote 
themselves into war. Muravchik cites Kant in his testament that democracies are more 
peaceful than non-democracies, for because “the consent of citizens is required to decide 
whether or not war should be declared,” the citizens would have to decide to ship 
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themselves off to war, which is unlikely.118 Kaplan and Kristol also directly quote Kant, 
who wrote that these conditions are not present in autocracies, “for the head of state is not 
a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the 
slightest sacrifice.” They write that “the ethics and institutions of democracy encourage 
compromise and other norms of that democratic states then apply to their relations one 
another” whereas “nondemocratic states, needless to say, do not.”119 
Third, neoconservatives contend that democracies foster liberal norms of non-violence 
amongst its citizens, norms that translate to nonviolence by the state through democratic 
representation. Muravchik argues that “democracy is at bottom an ethical system, in 
which the citizens discipline themselves to the principle that it is better to decide things 
by the right means than to get their own way.”120 The willingness to do what is right 
rather than what is expedient is anthropomorphized onto the state as a whole, which acts 
likewise. This reasoning is normative, for democratic norms “mandate nonviolent conflict 
resolution and negotiation in a spirit of live-and-let-live.”121 For example, Europeans, 
Stephens writes, “[live] in the world of Immanuel Kant, in which ‘perpetual peace’ [is] 
guaranteed by a set of cultural conventions, consensually agreed rules and a belief in the 
virtues of social solidarity.”122 Muravchik explicitly writes that the monadic democratic 
peace is not merely structural, it is normative, saying: 
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Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-
restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without 
recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their 
domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings 
with other nations….The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off 
like a spigot. The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states, 
however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to 
accommodate those interests except when the other party’s behavior seems 
threatening or outrageous.123 
A fourth rationale, given by Irving Kristol, is a bit more nuanced — the citizens of a 
democracy cannot, at least in the long run, accept an amoral foreign policy. While a 
democratic government can also ‘wag the dog’ like autocracies, it is less likely to do so 
successfully, and thus less likely to attempt to do so. For the United States, for example, 
“‘realism’ has to be conceived and expressed in a way that allows us to live, if a bit 
uncomfortably now and then, with our moral selves.”124 Whereas the populace does not 
have the expertise to make judgements on military or foreign policy, anyone can judge a 
policy on its morality. And as democratic governments are supposed to, at least to some 
extent, be a representation of the will of the populace, when a government acts immorally 
in a foreign policy, it is likewise a black mark on the morality of the populace. What 
results, as Kristol argues is the case for the United States, is a “continual effort to 
reconcile the moral dimension of American foreign policy — the realm in which some 
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freedom of choice exists — with the realistic dimension of foreign policy,” or what 
Reinhold Niebuhr calls ‘moral realism’.125 In regards to liberal values, Kagan writes that 
“supporting democracy is consistent with [American] principles”; it “makes them feel 
good about themselves.”126 
This rationale is what Sebastian Rosato calls the ‘institutional logic’ of ‘public restraint’, 
as the causal mechanism here is democracy’s institutional forces.127 Democratic values 
(often used synecdotally for liberal values) are embedded within the mindset of the 
citizenry (see Muravchik’s explanation above), including non-violence. Democratic states 
have laws allowing individuals to openly express their opinions on government policy, 
including foreign policy. Moreover, politicians’ seats are definite, up for reelection every 
few years. Wanting to win reelection, politicians will sometimes move to an anti-war 
stance to appease their voting base. Because of this, some neoconservatives believe that 
all things equal democracies are weaker than authoritarian states because they are less 
willing to use military force. 
Neoconservatives have also come to deride “working with local dictators,” a fulcrum of 
Cold War era containment policy, as an “old ‘realist’ prescription” that will not work 
over the long term because of the nature of authoritarian regimes.128 According to 
William Kristol, “the nature of the regime is crucial, rather than some alleged underlying, 
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geographically or economically or culturally determined ‘national interest.’”129 Unlike 
democratic states, authoritarian (especially dictatorial) regimes “sponsor terrorism and 
acquire and trade in horrific weapons, the better to threaten their neighbors and intimidate 
their people.”130 Alliances with autocratic regimes “are inherently difficult to sustain,” 
because they are difficult for democratic populaces to stomach and because democratic 
ideals and the structure of the world economy “tend to corrode the pillars on which 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes rest.”131 Boot argues that because “alliances built 
with unpopular strongmen are unlikely to last” democratic nations like the U.S. should 
push for reform within the regimes of its allies, such as Egypt or the Gulf monarchies.132 
Relationships between democratic and autocratic states may seem prudent in the short (or 
even medium term), but the norms and ideals promoted by democratic states are 
intrinsically threatening to autocratic ones, even if materially the democratic states are 
not as threatening. 
These countries also risk becoming rogue states, states that “suppress basic human rights 
and promote radical ideologies…, exhibit a chronic inability to engage constructively 
with the outside world,...[and embark] on ambitious and costly military program[s].”133 
Above all, these states seek to break down the international system and the norms it 
regulates. Though most of what neoconservatives (and others like Anthony Lake) label as 
rogue states are not great powers, increasing capabilities, such as the acquisition of 
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nuclear weapons or long-range chemical weapons (the famed ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’), make their existence an inherent threat to the world community and that 
what it represents. Even a weak nation can cast the shadow of a great one with the right 
technology. 
Accordingly, neoconservatives have been weary of authoritarian regimes ranging from 
Chavez’s Venezuela134 to Bashir’s Sudan.135 This logic has been applied to as far-
reaching countries as Uzbekistan, of which William Kristol and Stephen Schwartz wrote 
that “the character of the Karimov regime can no longer be ignored in deference to the 
strategic usefulness of Uzbekistan,” calling for the cutting off of aid and friendly 
relations.136 China and Russia are viewed as a “revisionist great powers” because “as 
autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international 
system and by the democracies on their borders.”137 Bret Stephens writes that Iran cannot 
be viewed using like conceptions of rationality as democracies, because “what Iran finds 
pragmatic and rational—support for militias and terrorist organizations abroad; a posture 
of unyielding hostility to the West; a nuclear program that floats multiple UN resolutions 
— is rather different from the thinking that prevails in, say, the Netherlands.”138 And 
neoconservatives are most famous, of course, for their call for regime change in Iraq 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, which they eventually achieved. 
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Even supposed U.S. allies are subject to criticism from neoconservatives. In 2002 
Schwartz called Saudi Arabia’s travel ban on its Shi’a citizens “a measure reminiscent of 
Soviet communism” and says that it is “increasingly clear that Saudi Arabian Wahhabism 
is part of the ‘axis of evil’—and possibly the most dangerous part.”139 Max Boot 
disparaged Reagan and Bush’s funding of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union as “a classic realpolitik strategy” and asserted that “America has earned 
opprobrium in the Arab world for its realpolitik backing of repressive dictators like Hosni 
Mubarak and the Saudi royal family.”140 Of Cairo and Riyadh Kagan writes that “it is 
possible that over time Egypt and Saudi Arabia may see virtue in drawing closer to their 
fellow autocrats in Moscow and Beijing.”141 Muravchik argues that the United States’ 
“quiet support for Iraq in its war with Iran in the 1980s” was “one of America’s most 
nakedly realist sallies.”142 The alignment of autocratic regimes in the Middle East with 
the United States, and the hostility of a democratic Palestine against the United States, is 
an exception. Rather, neoconservatives tend to be skeptical that autocratic allies will 
remain friendly in the long run. 
Divisions amongst Neocons 
Not all neoconservatives denounce every autocrat at all times; the degree to which a 
neoconservative thinks that structural forces affects state behavior influences the extent to 
which a state should continue to ally with autocrats. A democratic nation would rather 
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not ally with an autocratic nation, but sometimes it can be prudent for one to do so, 
sometimes for resource procurement, sometimes to reign in an autocratic nation for fear 
of it acting belligerent in the short term. More simply, neoconservatives to a varying 
extent advocate for geopolitical strategic thinking irrespective of the consequences of 
regime types. 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, for instance, harshly criticized the Carter administration’s open 
support of the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, 
two autocrats that were “positively friendly to the U.S.” and “anti-communist.” Even 
though “traditional autocracies are, in general and in their very nature, deeply offensive 
to modern American sensibilities,” traditional autocrats are still better than communist (or 
theocratic) autocrats.143 For her, ‘communist revolution’ is synonymous with future 
totalitarianism, which is worse than moderate authoritarianism, for both the people of the 
nations where revolutions are occurring, and the United States. Because communist 
regimes “claim jurisdiction over the whole life of the society and make demands for 
change that so violate internalized values and habits,” they “create refugees by the 
million.” While her theoretical underpinnings of why autocratic regimes are preferable, 
that “they do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of 
residence, [and] habitual patterns of family and personal relations,” is not the most 
compelling – for I am not sure that stasis is inherently less violent than transformation – 
empirically Kirkpatrick has a point.144 Whereas a tyrant like the Shah may have killed 
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upwards of 2,000 over the entirety of his 26 years as lone head of state,145 that pales 
compared to deaths at the hands of Pol Pot (2 million), Dergian Ethiopia (725 thousand), 
Castro (73 thousand), or Maoist China (35 million).146 For this reason, she writes that a 
“policy which aims at protecting our own interest and assisting the capacities for self-
determination of less developed nations will need to face the unpleasant fact that, if 
victorious, violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to 
anything but totalitarian tyranny.”147 
Irving Kristol was also more of a ‘realist’ than later neocons, and certainly was not as 
idealistic when it came to democracy promotion as his son, believing that though 
democratic nations are more peaceful than autocratic ones, it is unrealistic to transform a 
state’s government overnight. He thought this for two reasons. First, he believed that the 
political culture of some states were not ready or willing to embark upon democratic 
modernization. While hesitant to make a definitive claim on the causal nature for this, he 
says that empirically the “political, religious, [and] cultural [traditions] that shape Latin 
American thinking and behavior are such as to make it exceedingly difficult for the 
countries of Southern America to proceed along lines followed by Northern America and 
Western Europe” and “much of Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia are not very 
different from Latin America in this respect.”148 Second, Kristol thought that democracy 
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promotion had to be done in stages, for “liberal democracy cannot simply be summoned 
into existence, anywhere, at any time, by eloquent advocacy or even congressional 
resolution.”149 These arguments are essentially in line with the thinking of John Stuart 
Mill, who argued that democracy brought into existence by an outside actor will have no 
guarantees of permanence because democracy depends on its people’s commitment to 
liberal values; a foreign imposed democracy circumvents that requirement and actually 
can degrade a commitment to democracy.150 
Moreover, he recognized that the nature of states is not binary; a state is not either 
autocratic or democratic, without shades of gray in between. Kristol thought that “some 
dictatorships may claim a degree of political legitimacy that even liberal democrats ought 
to respect” and found it “a little absurd,” or at least “highly impractical to declare that all 
of the world’s undemocratic regimes [to be] equally an anathema” to a democracy like 
the United States.151 Ultimately, he says that “to the degree that any authoritarian regime 
was ‘enlightened’ — i.e., to the degree that it could be judged to be creating economic, 
political, and cultural preconditions for the possible self-government by the people — it 
was worthy of cautious respect.” Foreshadowing the errors of his son, the elder Kristol 
thought that if the moral dilemmas of foreign policy did not address the world’s 
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complexity and heterogeneousness, a democratic state could embark upon “sweeping 
crusades...which quickly brings us up short before intractable realities.”152 
As one would expect, the time period in which each individual neoconservative 
developed their respective explanations for state behavior was a large determinant in 
influencing the balance between structural and state level factors. Nearly all 
neoconservatives are American, and thus America’s geopolitical position in the world has 
greatly influenced neoconservatives, as have the presence of competing ideologies 
(which too were shaped by their historical development). Specifically, neoconservatives 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall tended to lean closer towards realism than their post-
Cold War successors. Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick’s careers were mostly during 
the Cold War, especially during the later years of the Cold War, when realism was the 
leading theory. During the Cold War, spreading democracy was only useful insofar as it 
helped to protect against the Soviet Union. Irving Kristol thought that it was useful, but 
there were times when allying with dictators was perceived to be prudent. Swift regime 
change was unrealistic, and instead the United States should have used its “influence to 
edge unenlightened despotisms toward more enlightened behavior, or enlightened 
despotisms toward more liberal and humane behavior.”153 Besides, all communist states 
were autocratic if not outright totalitarian. Kristol once whimsically remarked that “I’m 
violently opposed to the United States going to war against any democratic communist 
regime. I agree in the abstract there’s no reason why communist regimes needn’t have 
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greater variety. I look forward to the day when they do.”154 Seeing the Russian bear to be 
more like the Siberian Grizzly than Misha, democracy promotion was deemed less 
pressing than the Soviet threat. 
After the Cold War, the neocons took a turn even further away from realism. For 
neoconservatives, the international system was shaped by what Charles Krauthammer 
called the ‘Unipolar Moment.’155 The United States was the sole superpower, with few, if 
any, existential threats. Therefore, democracy promotion, unilateralism, and regime type 
became more important because there was nothing to stop the US from executing its 
foreign policy — lesser powers haven’t exactly been lining up to balance against it. 
Moreover, the Cold War’s abrupt ending served as ‘proof’ that unabashed advocation of 
liberal values and opposition to communism (and other forms of authoritarianism) could 
work. Reagan’s direct approach to confronting the Soviet Union, from his 
uncompromising stance on nuclear policy to his famous Brandenburg Gate speech, 
inspired younger neoconservatives into thinking that ideals could be made reality with a 
heavy dose of grit. Fukuyama goes as far as to claim that “Neoconservatives would not 
have taken this turn [towards unilateralism] but for the peculiar way that the Cold War 
ended.”156 William Kristol and Robert Kagan made this clear, stating that “the United 
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States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral 
confidence.”157  
The younger Kristol, Muravchik, Max Boot, Bret Stephens, David Brooks and the rest of 
what Justin Vaïsse calls the “Third Age” of neoconservatism more forcefully advocated 
for democracy promotion over realpolitik than their predecessors. For them, smaller 
autocratic nations had the potential to be adversarial because of the nature of their 
regimes, not because of their potential to be pawns of a larger power. Without the 
presence of a fellow superpower toting nuclear weapons, neoconservatives saw the next 
threat to be smaller states with the potential to acquire nuclear weapons, either for 
themselves or for terrorist organizations. Modern day neoconservatives critique some 
Reaganite policies of cozying up too close to dictators, even though some of these 
policies were architected by earlier neocons like Jeane Kirkpatrick. This is not to say that 
Irving Kristol did not believe in the monadic democratic peace theory; as shown above, 
he certainly did. But it would not have made sense for him to emphasize it in the 1960s 
and 70s because communism was the bigger threat. A rogue state would have been just as 
much of a threat to the Soviet Union as to the United States, after all. 
Compatibility with neoconservative domestic theory 
Some scholars argue that the neoconservative view of the democratic peace theory is 
incompatible with their domestic policy; the idea that democracy can be imposed from 
above seems strange coming from a group that is skeptical of government imposed social 
engineering. Such criticism, though seemingly valid, misunderstands how 
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neoconservatives view both economics and democracy. Piki Ish-Shalom, for example, 
writes that neoconservatism straddles the theses of Samuel Huntington and Francis 
Fukuyama, using the democratic peace theory as a bridge. As they are hostile towards 
cultural relativism, Ish-Shalom writes that neoconservatives agree with Huntington that 
certain cultural norms and practices make universal democracy unlikely while also 
agreeing with Fukuyama that Western liberal values will ultimately win out. 
Neoconservatives then advocate for the democratic peace theory in a structural sense, 
which is the idea that democracy as “a structure of elections, division of power, and 
checks and balances” is what causes peace, so that even if a “culture of and morality of 
the sort that create a civic community” does not arise due to pre-existing Burkian cultural 
norms, peace will still exist.158 It is for this reason, for example, neoconservatives 
advocate for regime change regardless of supposed inhibiting cultural norms. 
The problem with Ish-Shalom’s analysis is two-fold. First, it discounts the 
neoconservatives’ belief in the normative aspects of democracy, which he defines as “the 
socialization of and dissemination of democratic values so as to foster a democratic 
society and culture” resulting in “norms of tolerance and openness within these states” 
and an increased “willingness to reach compromises.”159 But, as I have already shown 
above, neoconservatives believe in both structural and normative theories of democratic 
peace. The idea behind Irving Kristol’s moral realism is concretely normative. Second, 
neoconservatives believe that democracy, and liberal ideals more broadly, are universally 
yearned for. Human rights and basic freedoms of speech and representation are self-
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evident and thus “belong to all human beings just by the virtue of their humanity” and as 
such for neoconservatives “neither reason nor morality is encumbered by parochial 
considerations thrown up by tradition, custom, or habit.”160 For neoconservatives, basic 
rights and liberties are something that are universal, and, given the opportunity, will be 
welcomed by all peoples. Francis Fukuyama, who famously claimed that “the end point 
of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government” was, after all, a neoconservative (for a time).161 
Therefore, the neoconservative skepticism of social engineering is not applied to 
democracy promotion because they are promoting a natural progression of human 
government. Though Fukuyama would diverge from neoconservatives over the latter’s 
interpretation of his theory, this is neither here nor there; this divergence actually makes 
it either to identify neoconservative ideology. For neoconservatives, social engineering in 
the economic sense cannot be compared to ‘democratic engineering’ (nor would they 
even phrase it this way) because for the latter there is no ‘invisible hand’ that would 
autocorrect when there are interventions in the market. Social engineering in the 
economic sense goes against the grain of the economic state of nature, the free market, 
and thus for neoconservatives it is much more likely to fail. Interventions in support of 
democratization are not subject to market corrections. 
Conclusion: Neoconservatism and Liberalism 
Because of the neoconservative commitment to human rights, personal liberty coupled 
with their staunch adherence to the monadic democratic peace theory, I would argue, 
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with some reservations, that neoconservatism largely falls in line with liberal theories of 
international relations. Andrew Moravcsik lays out three core assumption of liberal 
international relations theory, which neoconservatism is actually quite congruent with. 
First, according to Moravcsik, “liberal theory rests on a ‘bottom up’ view of politics in 
which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to 
politics.”162 By largely basing their core assumptions on the monadic democratic peace 
theory, neoconservatism to a certain extent can be described this way. For 
neoconservatives, the peacefulness of democracies, as I have shown, rests on both 
normative factors, like commitments to ethical liberal values of non-violence, and 
institutional factors, like a populace not wanting to vote in leaders that would send them 
to war or have an amoral foreign policy. I am hesitant to say that neoconservatism is a 
‘bottom-up’ approach per say because it starts with democracy as a political institution as 
starting point. But it does claim that democracies are naturally linked with the individual 
and societal groups embedded within it, so it is very much liberal in this way. 
Second, Moravcsik writes that “states (or other political institutions) represent some 
subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state 
preferences and act purposively in world politics.”163 Again, the neoconservative 
conception of monadic democratic peace theory is partially based on the idea that the 
interests of the populace can be translated into foreign policy decisions. Neoconservatives 
even conceive authoritarian regimes of having representation that “includes [sic] stable 
characteristics of the political process, formal or informal, that privilege societal 
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interests.” For authoritarian regimes, of course, societal interests are ultimately a function 
of their own interests, but this is beside the point. In order to wag the dog, the 
government must still pay attention to the interests of the dog. 
Finally, “the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior” 
where “instead, each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying 
constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.”164 Neoconservatives also do not 
assume that the national interest of states is the same for every state, non-democratic or 
democratic. Like liberals, neoconservatism “rejects not just the realist assumption that 
state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual, but equally the institutionalist 
assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, 
compromising a collective action problem.”165 I go into further detail about the 
neoconservative conception of the national interest in chapter five, but in short, the 
neoconservative view of the national interest is similar to Moravcsik’s, with the caveat 
that it should be in a democracy’s national interest to promote democracy. But, unlike 
realists (and neoliberals), neoconservatives do not assume a state will always act in its 
national interest. 
Moravcsik categorizes liberalism into three strands— ideational liberalism, commercial 
liberalism, and republican liberalism, the last of which there is much overlap with 
neoconservatism. Republican liberalism “emphasizes the ways in which domestic 
institutions and practices aggregate those demands, transforming them into state 
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policy.”166 Because authoritarian regimes are not subject to democratic institutional 
restraints, they tend to have a more variable range of policy decisions, which can result in 
increased violence. Neoconservatism can therefore be seen as a variant of republican 
liberal theory, with some key differences. First, neoconservatives, because they hold most 
of the assumptions of monadic democratic peace theory to be true, take a more drastic 
view of the belligerency of autocracies and the benevolence of democracies. Second, 
their conception of the democratic peace is also normative, unlike republican theory 
which looks at the relationship between the executive (or coalition) and the populace in 
the context of rent seeking. Democracy for neoconservatives, as stated earlier, is a 
normative, ethical system where the spirit of live-and-let-live is anthropomorphized onto 
the government. In a way, this point is actually similar to ideational liberalism, which 
“views the configuration of domestic social identities and values as a basic determinant 
of state preferences and, therefore, of interstate conflict and cooperation.”167 Finally, the 
neoconservative view of anarchy is not entirely compatible with republican liberalism. I 
will address this in detail in chapter five, but because neoconservatives have such a 
pessimistic view of autocracies, they share several key assumptions with realists. In spite 
of these assumptions, I contend that neoconservatism is still clearly in the liberal range of 
international relations theories. 
To be clear, evidence in support of the Kantian version of democratic peace theory is 
disputed. Of the four rationales in support of it given by neoconservatives, none are 
empirically strong. Many democratic nations do not have a draft, making Kant’s 
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reasoning less useful. The ethical nature of democratic values translating to ethical 
foreign policy is difficult to prove (and has often shown to not be true). And sometimes 
citizens will not rise up in protest of a war, especially if they are far removed from it. 
Furthermore, it seems hypocritical for neoconservatives to make claims about 
authoritarian states respecting the ‘rules of the road’ when neoconservative policymakers 
from the democratic United States disregarded international law in its invading of Iraq. 
But for the purposes of this paper, this is beside the point. The theoretical basis can be 
disputed, even flawed; if any theoretical basis were universally agreed upon and 
“demonstrated accuracy via-a-vis other theories, significantly less theories of 
international relations would exist. Accordingly, given the evidence of usage, it seems 
fitting that the monadic democratic peace theory is the theoretical basis for a 
neoconservative theory of international relations. 
Chapter 5: Comparison with the Neo-Neo Synthesis 
Neoconservatism at its core is a theory that sees the world First, neoconservatives paint 
the world in such a matter-of-fact way that it seems natural to comp their worldview with 
the two leading ontological theories. Second, emphasis on the significance of military 
might and hegemony in world politics runs much closer to the neo-neo synthesis’ 
portrayal of the state as a ‘rational egoist’ than post-structuralism theories which tend to 
be more emancipatory and revisionists in nature. And though squabbles between 
neorealism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism may be ‘boring’ (some168 say the neo-
neo synthesis has been overdone), even more boring would be a comparison of 
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neoconservatism and, say, classical Marxism — nothing fruitful would come of it. This 
section specifically addresses neoconservatism’s relationship with the neo-neo synthesis’ 
views on the existence of an anarchical world structure, survival tactics of states, and the 
role and purpose of institutions such as the United Nations. 
Anarchy 
To be clear, neoconservatives, by the very nature of starting with the assumptions of the 
monadic democratic peace theory as a theoretical basis, reject the initial structural 
assumptions of the neo-neo synthesis. But neoconservatives to a large extent agree with 
the consequence of the synthesis’ structural assumption, anarchy. In this section I will 
show that though anarchy is not presupposed by neoconservatives because of structural 
forces, neoconservatives make similar assumptions to neorealists about the way in which 
states deal with anarchy, at least under certain conditions. 
Neorealists argue that “international politics can be understood only if the effects of 
structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism.”169  The nature of 
sovereignty, which grants authority to a governing body over a set area, entails that no 
other central authority can have full rule over that area. Thus, anarchy is “an ordering 
principle, which says that the system comprises independent states” without central 
rule.170 Anarchy is the opposite of “hierarchy, which is the ordering principle of domestic 
politics.”171 Neorealist Joseph Grieco, using more alarmist language, describes anarchy as 
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an international system where “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from 
using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them.”172 Neoliberals also 
admit the existence of anarchy. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane define anarchy as “a 
lack of common government in world politics.”173 
Neoconservatives agree with the principle of anarchy but, as I will show, their conception 
of anarchy is fundamentally different than neorealists. Irving Kristol writes that we live in 
“a world ordered by military force and by the willingness to use that force when 
circumstances require. Whoever does not have such force, or is overly reluctant to use it, 
ends up living in a world that has been ordered by someone else.”174 For 
neoconservatives, “rather than a Kantian world where international law, globalization and 
non-state actors would make war irrelevant in most cases, they see a Hobbesian world in 
which military force and state actors still play an overwhelming role—a belief which, this 
time, takes them closer to realists.”175 Like the two partakers in the neo-neo synthesis, 
neoconservatives like Charles Krauthammer recognize “the fundamental fallacy in the 
whole idea of the international system being modeled on domestic society.”176 That is, 
“what holds domestic society together is a supreme central authority wielding a 
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monopoly of power and enforcing norms,” whereas internationally “there is no such 
thing.”177 
Part of the reason why neorealists argue for anarchy’s abiding nature is because states can 
never truly tell the intentions of other states. The inherent condition of misinformation 
lead states to be suspicious of one another’s future policy decisions, even if publically a 
state asserts its benevolence. As put by Mearsheimer, “there are many possible causes of 
aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them,” 
leading no state “to be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability 
against the first.”178 
Kristol too held this view, smugly denouncing the legitimacy of ‘kremlinologists’, those 
who claimed to know “what Soviet Leaders were really thinking about foreign policy and 
what was really going on inside the ‘inner circles’ of a regime.”179  Dismissing 
kremlinology as being based on “the most evanescent of clues”, Kristol notes “the 
observation of Soviet actions, and frequent glances at the map are quite sufficient 
guidance as to what the Soviet government is ‘really’ up to.”180 Moreover, Kristol’s 
suspicion of foreign states’ intentions also applies to the progression of nuclear 
proliferation. Afraid of the “dangers of a lot of kooky little (or not so little) nations 
playing around with nuclear weapons,” like “India, or Pakistan, or Egypt, or Brazil,”181 
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Kristol asserts that the U.S. (or other great power) needs to make sure that the smaller 
nations do not acquire nuclear weapons, precisely because these states cannot be trusted 
with a weapon that can affect even nations that are not the primary target. He argued that 
that United States should not de-arm itself even if it were possible to know that the 
Russians would have “forbearance” in its ownership of nuclear weapons because it would 
be impossible to predict the preferences of “the Chinese, the Japanese, the Egyptians, the 
Moroccans, the Indonesians, etc., who will have their own nuclear weapons in years to 
come.”182  
Neoconservatives also agree with neorealists that foreign policy decisions can be shaped 
by constraints of the international system. Kristol oft wondered, with more than a hint of 
lamentation, why a great power like the United States could be constrained by various 
other forces, including lesser powers. His answer was that in absence of absolute 
hegemonic military might, the world system can always be disturbed by even the smallest 
of actors. The United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War particularly exemplifies 
this viewpoint, illustrating the power of structural forces over governmental and societal 
views of foreign policy. In 1967 the U.S.’ involvement in the war was at a crossroad. 
Public demonstrations against the war were rampant, and even politicians and military 
officials were wary of the consequences of greater involvement in the war. In spite of the 
mounting anti-war sentiment, Kristol notes that “greater military involvement...seems to 
be precisely the direction in which American policy is heading.” Eventually, Kristol 
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concludes that “even great powers, in the modern world, are not exactly masters of their 
fate.”183 
The reverse is also true — no small nation can be truly isolationist in world politics, for it 
cannot ignore the influence of larger world powers. Kristol defines world power as a 
nation that “will influence events, will affect the destinies of other peoples, as much by 
what it does not do as by what it overtly does.”184 On the influence of the world powers 
over the lesser, he says that the “very existence of a world power creates conditions of 
dependency and interdependency- and also engenders the obligations (morals, political, 
economic) which flow from such conditions.”185 He further develops the idea of the 
interconnectedness of the global structure affecting all states, writing that “the nations of 
the rest of the world are perhaps too inclined to enjoy a certain Schadenfreude over 
America’s foreign policy dilemmas, and tend not to realize the extent to which their own 
destinies are being, if not decided, then at least provisionally shaped.”186 For 
neoconservatives, the action of one state is inherently dependent on the action (or 
inaction) of other states, in particular of world powers. 
The important difference between strict structural theories and neoconservatism is that 
anarchy exists for neoconservatives only with the existence of non-democratic states. 
Rather than structure being intertwined with anarchy, anarchy is a function of the 
persistence of autocratic rule. When neoconservatives speak of not being able to fully 
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know the intentions of states, what they are really talking about are non-democracies. 
Note that the nations Kristol was speaking about above were all non-democracies (with 
the exception of India), at least of the time of his writing. In many ways, the neorealist 
view of anarchy can be bestowed upon neoconservatives given that the states being 
looked at are non-democracies. If the world was made up entirely of non-democracies, 
for instance, I would go as far to say that the neoconservative conception of the world 
would look nearly identical to the neorealist. Of course, neorealists hold that states are 
black boxes; structural forces provide for the same sets of incentives for all states, no 
matter what type. Nor are all states non-democracies, so a neoconservative world can 
never be the same as a neorealist’s. 
I would argue, however, that a neoconservative world is defined by what I would 
describe as “fragmentary anarchy”. Anarchy is fragmented because it does not exist 
amongst democracies, for the forces of democratic peace make neorealist assumptions of 
uniform incentives irrelevant. Amongst non-democracies and between democracies and 
non-democracies, however, much of the assumptions made by neorealists still exist. 
Specifically, John Mearsheimer outlines five assumptions of structural realists- (1) “Great 
powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system”; (2) 
“All states possess some offensive military capability”; (3) “States can never be certain 
about the intentions of other states”; (4) “The main goal of states is survival” including 
“[maintaining] their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political 
order”; (5) “states are rational actors”.187 Of these five assumptions, neoconservatives 
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would agree with the first two assumptions outright, and would agree with the third under 
the condition that ‘other states’ be replaced with ‘non-democracies’. Kagan writes that 
“in most places, the nation-state remains as strong as ever, and so, too, the nationalist 
ambitions, passions, and competition among nations that have shaped history.”188 The 
world system is the same as it always has been — “the clashing of interests and ambitions 
of the great powers...producing the alliances and counter-alliances, and the elaborate 
dances and shifting partnerships, that a nineteenth century diplomat would recognize 
instantly.”189 
Mearsheimer's fourth and fifth assumptions are not held by neoconservatives. While they 
would mostly agree with the fourth assumption, neoconservatives would be wary to make 
such an absolute claim. Some, even most, autocracies may prioritize survival over all 
other goals, but many dictators may not because they cannot be treated as rational actors. 
If an actor is irrational, it cannot be counted on to act in its best interest. Kaplan and 
Kristol argue that Saddam Hussein, for example, lacked “sanity, prudence, and self-
control”, was “a pathological risk-taker” who possessed “supreme irrationality”.190 It is 
specifically because non-democratic states are authoritarian that the intentions of states 
cannot be known. If a state were to always act rationally, the actions of that state would 
be easier to decipher, even given imperfect information. 
Robert Kagan’s book Of Paradise and Power is centered on the idea of fragmentary 
anarchy. He writes that “Europe...is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of 
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laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation” while “the United States 
remains mired in history, exercising power in anarchic Hobbesian world where 
international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and 
promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.”191 
His use of the word ‘Hobbesian’ is loose; he does not relate the cause of anarchy to 
human hubris and vainglory like Hobbes does, but instead relates it to the nature of 
autocratic states and the lack of world government. Kagan endorses British diplomat 
Robert Cooper’s idea of “double standards”, which is that European nations should 
“operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security” within Europe, but when 
dealing with autocratic states, they should “revert to the rougher methods of an earlier 
era—force, preemptive action, deception, whatever is necessary.” Europe, a continent 
made up entirely of democracies, is situated in a “postmodern” Kantian world, whereas 
much of the rest of the world can be viewed as “modern and pre-modern zones” of 
anarchy.192 Non-democratic states which “refuse to abide by” the rules and “laws of 
civilized society” make up these zones of anarchy.193 
Though my comparison of the neoconservative and neorealist views of anarchy stems 
from fundamentally different logic, the results are fairly similar, given that the world 
consists of democracies and non-democracies alike. Because there is no world 
government, democracies will remain suspicious of autocracies, while autocracies will 
remain suspicious both democracies and fellow autocracies. The neoconservative version 
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of anarchy is not structural, but many of the neorealist assumptions upon which they 
define anarchy certainly overlap with neoconservatism. Moreover, this contention does 
not invalidate my claim that neoconservatism should be viewed as a part of the liberal 
tradition. Rather, the opposite is true. As put by Andrew Moravcsik, “liberal theory is 
analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions 
under which their assumptions hold.” The neoconservative logic of fragmentary anarchy 
does exactly this. 
This idea is not entirely new, but the logic behind it is. Scholars who write of “islands of 
peace” or “security communities” tend to rely on explanations of the dyadic democratic 
peace theory,194 the presence of “strong states” and absence of “weak states”,195 or that 
democracies (and some non-democracies) are “satisfied” or “status quo” powers.196 
Neoconservative international relations theory, on the other hand, uses the monadic 
democratic peace theory, which results in a different conception of how wars originate. 
The neoconservative conception of fragmentary anarchy is most similar to the dyadic 
democratic peace conception of security communities. But the world for 
neoconservatives when compared to proponents of the dyadic democratic peace is 
surprisingly less anarchic, not necessarily in absolute amounts of ears, but in terms of the 
number of potential war permutations. The dyadic DPT only removes the possibility of a 
democracy-democracy war (where the war is started by the first state in the permutation), 
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but it leaves open the possibility of democracy-non-democracy and non-democracy-
democracy war.  As explained in chapter four, neoconservatives deny the possibility of a 
democracy-non- democracy.  
The other two explanations also are quite different. Neoconservatism and proponents of 
the “weak states” explanation of peace are not speaking on the same terms; the former 
speaks of wars between states while the latter speaks mainly of wars within states. The 
“status quo” explanation by definition contradicts the realist (and neoconservative, at 
least for autocracies) notion that intentions of state cannot be known; “status quo” and 
“revisionist” are concrete intentions. Thus, the neoconservative conception of 
fragmentary anarchy is distinct from the other concepts of “security communities” or 
“islands of peace”. 
What is the National Interest? 
Even though neoconservatives seem to hold that anarchy is an important aspect of the 
international relations system, they make something different of it than neorealists and 
neoliberals. Instead of maintaining that states will act in their narrow survival oriented 
self-interest, national interests are flexible and not necessarily objective. 
As mentioned earlier, neorealists hold that in the face of anarchy, states will do all in their 
power to survive. As power is finite, “anarchy forces security-seeking states to compete 
with each other for power, because power is the best means to survival.” If a state is 
unable to maintain its “territorial integrity,...it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue 
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other aims.”197 When need be, states will ‘cheat,’ or break away from alliances, 
institutional participation, or treaties in order to pursue their own, independent policies. 
Some neorealists believe that survival entails merely enduring, meaning that states will 
be satisfied with survival alone. Others think that states will aim for hegemony, for 
nothing short of complete dominance of the international system will guarantee security. 
But at the crux of neorealist thought is the notion that comparative gains, as opposed to 
absolute gains, are at the essence of state decision-making. Thence, “states worry that 
today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains 
that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the 
future.”198 
Neoliberals too hold that states will do what is in their best interests for survival, but 
survival entails acting in a more cooperative manner. Rejecting that states care about 
comparative gains, neoliberals say that as ‘rational egoists,’ states care primarily about 
their own lot. Neoliberals warn of the danger in thinking that states exist “outside of 
human society,”199 for doing so severely limits the “shadow of the future.”200 As state 
decisions in the international system are repeated continuously, cooperation is often 
incentivized, because cheating will be met with reprimand by other states over the long 
term (sometimes after even just one occurrence). Moreover, because state decision-
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making is regularly based on the decisions of other states, reciprocity is similarly 
regularly in the best interests of both states, such as in the case with trade. 
Neoconservatives’ approach to anarchy is more nuanced, because unlike the parties of the 
neo-neo synthesis, they do not define the national interest in narrow terms. To those that 
say that a great power like the U.S. should act in a manner of survival or national interest, 
Irving Kristol says that they have “little difficulty in demonstrating that both are 
disingenuous.”201 Moreover, he says that ‘national interest’ as a neorealist concept is 
flawed once contextualized, as “the idea of ‘national interest’ is derived from a false 
analogy with the status of Great Britain as a world power in the 19th century.”202 Imperial 
Britain’s well-being depended directly on its ability to maintain mercantilist monopolies 
across the globe, whereas for the United States the free market annuls this need. Kristol 
repeatedly points to situations that where the United States enacted foreign policies 
incongruent with its supposed national interest. Supporting Joseph-Désiré Mobutu in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo had “no direct concern—economic or military” to the 
United States. Similarly, the U.S. playing “the role of mediator and arbitrator in the 
Cyprus dispute” was not “any kind of narrow self-interest” for the U.S. “could not care 
less about Cyprus itself, where we have neither bases nor investments.”203 This leads 
Kristol to conclude that “acting the world power is for her a burden not a privilege.”204 
For neoconservatives, national interest is a subjective concept; if it was objective, 
international politics would be mostly determined and largely predictable. As put by 
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Joshua Muravchik, “whatever the scholarly merits of Waltz’ theory,...if his argument is 
true—that external circumstances compel states to behave as they do—our policy debates 
have a lot less consequence than we imagine.”205 In a debate with Stephen Walt, 
Muravchik snides at the realist’s notion that “he sees the world for what it really is” when 
really “the real world is nuanced, often ambiguous”, and ultimately chides that “Walt’s 
world is stick figures, straw men, parodies, exaggerations”.206 Kagan and William Kristol 
concur, writing that:  
The complicated workings of foreign policy and the exceptional position of the 
United States should guard against believing that the national interest can be 
measured in a quasi-scientific fashion, or that areas of “vital” national interest can 
be located, and other areas excluded, by a purely geopolitical determinations. 
Determining what is in America’s national interest is an art, not a science. It 
requires not only the measurement of power but also an appreciation of beliefs, 
principles, and perceptions, which cannot be quantified.207 
Not defining the national interest in terms of survival allows neoconservatives to 
reinforce the notion that regime types matter. Whereas neo-realists are not able to explain 
the actions of states based on anything other than structural factors, neoconservatives 
recognize that the national interest for autocrats is often simply furthering the life of their 
regime. As mentioned in chapter four, wars are a way for regimes to drum up nationalist 
spirit and gain legitimacy. But they also can be used to support other autocrats in order to 
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display their commitment to suppressing liberal values. Stephens, observing that North 
Korea, China, Russia, and Iran (a group he labels “Dictatorship, Inc.”), have all to 
varying degrees supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, contends they have done so 
not entirely out narrow self-interest, saying that “there are interests that go beyond lives 
and money.” The interest they all have in common is “to see a popular rebellion against 
tyranny fail spectacularly.” In more detail he claims that: 
Syria isn’t so much a country as it is an exhibit for Dictatorship Inc., the main 
purpose of which is to show that resistance really is futile. That’s why Russia 
doesn’t shrink from bombing civilian hospitals, or Hezbollah from starving entire 
cities into submission, or Assad from using chemical weapons. They are showing 
their respective publics the lengths to which they are prepared to go to maintain 
their own grip on power.208 
Robert Kagan also sees states balancing not based on narrow geopolitical self-interest, 
but of a self-interest based on regime type. Because liberal democracies stand 
fundamentally against the notion that autocratic regimes can gain legitimacy through 
force and coercion alone, in the long run they are a threat to autocracies. For this reason, 
Kagan writes that “the old competition between liberalism and autocracy has also 
reemerged, with the world’s great powers lining up according to the nature of their 
regime.”209 Despite the giant defense spending and nuclear arsenals of China and Russia, 
other autocrats are unlikely to see them as threats. Instead, “the rulers in Rangoon, 
Khartoum, Pyongyang, and Tehran know that their best and, as a last resort, only 
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protectors in a generally hostile world are to be found in Beijing and Moscow” because 
of their shared “common interests and a common view of international order.”210 
This is not to say that neoconservatives never use more narrow definitions of the national 
interest. Kristol declares that “elements of Realpolitik will surely have to be incorporated 
into our foreign policy, as in all foreign policies.”211 He argues that though war in South 
Vietnam is “not of critical significance to our national interest,” nor is “South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, or, in Europe, of Yugoslavia, Portugal, or Spain,” they 
have the potential to be. He says that “in isolation none of them is of great national 
importance to us,” but if they were to balance against the United States, “the shape of 
world politics would be decisively altered, and to our disadvantage.”212 
Naturally, some of the more idealist neoconservatives criticized Kristol for this. 
Muravchik labels Kristol as a ‘conservative neorealist’ because Kristol’s “opposition to 
alliances taken together with his opposition to foreign aid and to attempts to encourage 
the growth of democracy gives weight to” Charles Krauthammer’s chiding of Kristol as a 
“right isolationist.”213 Then again, Muravchik seems to only have a surface level 
appreciation for neorealism, taking neorealist to mean modern day proponents of balance-
of-power strategies. This flawed conceptualization leads him to conclude that figures like 
Kennedy advisor Arthur Schlesinger and paleoconservative Pat Buchanan are somehow 
neorealists, which is somewhat extraordinary. Nuances between iterations of realism are 
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similarly often lost (or at least ignored) by neoconservatives, equating realism broadly 
with realpolitik, which can lead to mischaracterizations like Muravchik’s. Ultimately 
though, neoconservatives object to external forces being the primary driver of state 
foreign policy. 
Institutions 
Given that neoconservatives hold that non-democracies create a system of fragmentary 
anarchy, might survival be had through collective security and institutionalism? On the 
contrary, neoconservatives harbor a deep skepticism, sometimes even a resentment, of 
institutions. Depending on the type of institution, neoconservatives have different 
explanations behind their skepticism. Institutions that include non-democracies are 
unlikely to prevent war, human rights violations, and internal conflict because of the 
participation of non-democracies, whose inherent characteristics are antithetical towards 
combating these problems. Institutions that are made up entirely of democracies would 
not have this problem but would still have collective action hampered by differences of 
national interest. This section will address neoconservatives’ views on the former type of 
institution, while the next will address the latter. 
Neoconservatives’ distrust of international institutions is near unanimous. As stated by 
Kristol, “no one seriously thinks that the United Nations can, in our lifetime, fill the 
vacuum that the retrenchment of United States commitments will create.”214 Bret 
Stephens quotes former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton as saying 
that “if the United Nations Secretariat building in New York ‘lost 10 stories, it wouldn’t 
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make a bit of difference’”, and questions why the remark is even controversial.215 Max 
Boot argues that there are “many international laws on the books prohibiting genocide, 
land mines, [and] biological weapons…[but] without enforcement mechanisms they are 
as meaningless as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.”216 Even Francis Fukuyama, a former 
neoconservative, still calls the neoconservative opinion of the United Nations, that “while 
useful for certain peacekeeping and nation-building operations, the United Nations lacks 
both democratic legitimacy and effectiveness in dealing with serious security issues,” to 
be “cogent.”217  
Fukuyama’s logic is more empirical than philosophical, noting that though “we have a 
relatively good understanding of how to create institutions that are rule bound, 
accountable and reasonably effective in the vertical silos we call states,...we do not have 
[sic] adequate mechanisms of horizontal accountability among states.” Neoconservatives 
readily agree with this. Kristol calls large scale collective security an “expectation [that] 
was probably always utopian.”218 Robert Kagan argues that power politics trumps 
whatever influence institutions may have, saying that “People may hope for a more 
harmonious world based on a new concert of nations, but the rise of great power 
competition and the clashing interests and ambitions of nations across Eurasia make such 
an evolution unlikely.”219 Stephens says that “the U.N. is a never-ending scandal 
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disguised as an everlasting hope” and “collective security is a recipe for international 
paralysis or worse.”220 Even more forcefully Kristol says, “Who but a dreamer could take 
seriously the notion that some 150 nations—ranging from primitive to civilized, the 
anarchic to the authoritarian, the stable to the chronically unstable, all with different 
interests, different histories, different political ideologies, and different religions—could 
collectively bring order and tranquility to the world?”221 Furthermore, opportunities for 
autocracies to cheat are numerous, as “in order to be effective and provide the assurances 
they are designed to bring, [multilateral agreements] must be carefully and universally 
adhered to by all signatories,”222 which institutions like the U.N. have difficulties 
enforcing. 
Irving Kristol’s disdain for the U.N. stems from it making smaller, lesser states “obliged 
to take public stands on all sorts of controversial issues that have no real significance for 
them.” For this reason, he argues that “such issues would be settled to our better 
advantage if we were to negotiate privately, bilaterally or multilaterally, with the nations 
directly involved.”223 The General Assembly leads to the disputes of great powers being 
opined upon by insignificant ones with the same amount of weight. The smaller nations, 
naturally, take a more “risk averse” approach to the United Nations, which in practicality 
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blocks the ability the U.N. to swiftly deal with crises.224 As put by Justin Vaïsse, “in the 
neoconservative vision, the United Nations is not only ineffective, it is also illegitimate 
because it is profoundly undemocratic. The U.N. General Assembly gives as much power 
to Libya as to India.”225 Additionally, the Security Council is no better, as it allows 
autocratic Russia and communist China to veto power over the rest of world. Instead of 
being a functional promoter of peace, U.N. Security Council has become “an arena for 
forging diplomatic roadblocks.”226 As such, Kristol says that “world government is a 
terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny,” and because institutions like the U.N. 
foolhardily try to act as one, they “should be regarded with the deepest suspicion.”227 For 
Kagan, the UNSC cannot grant “international legitimacy to actions...because it has 
become hopelessly paralyzed by the split between autocratic and democratic 
members.”228 
Nor can the United Nations stop great powers from acting autonomously from the wishes 
of the international community. For example, the United States’ funding of the 
Nicaraguan Contras was for Kristol “an opportunity not to be missed” for “argument 
from international law lacks all credibility.”229 Conceptually similar, but with the 
opposite sentiment, William Kristol saw it as a given that Russia would continue to 
meddle in Eastern Europe despite “widening its war against Georgia more than its 
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original — and in any case illegitimate — casus belli would justify.”230 While it is 
predictable that neoconservatives see the United States’ breaking of international law as 
justified but the Russians’ as illicit, regardless of their partiality, they are consistent in 
maintaining that international institutions will not stop great powers, or even weaker 
ones, from cheating. 
Joshua Muravchik, though normally skeptical of the U.N., had high hopes for the United 
Nations to improve as a violence queller, especially after Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali sought to create a permanent U.N. military force in order to respond “to 
outright aggression, imminent or actual.”231 But disaster for U.S. forces in Somalia 
coupled with a similar fate for Nigerian troops in Mogadishu, along with U.N. inaction in 
Rwanda, led to Muravchik reconfirming his pessimism. The problem was not the United 
Nations in theory, but the United Nations in practice as mix of democracies and non-
democracies. Because the U.N. “remains a collection of states, many of which are neither 
law abiding nor peaceful nor legitimated by the consent of those they govern,” it is 
doomed to be “less than the sum of its parts.”232  
Like for realists, institution-based peace is not unobtainable in the short term and in 
certain situations can prove to be quite useful. Collective security is something that 
should be aspired for if it can be in a state’s best interest. Paul Wolfowitz, long-time State 
Department and Pentagon advisor then serving as Undersecretary for Defense Policy, 
wrote in a leaked draft of the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 (later coined the 
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‘Wolfowitz Doctrine’) that it should be a goal of the United States to seek collective 
defense. One of the strategic goals he had in mind was to “strengthen and extend the 
system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together 
in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, avoids the 
renationalization of security policies, and provides security at lower costs and with lower 
risks for all.”233 Moreover, though NATO was formed more as an alliance against the 
Soviet Union than an institution of collective security, it seems that today it, along with 
the EU, serves just as much as a reinforcing force of democratization, making conflict 
between members unthinkable, rather than a protection against external aggression. 
Neoconservatives, with some exceptions,234 see NATO as useful for both reasons. The 
bombing of Milosevic’s Yugoslavian Serbia for the liberation of Kosovo is seen as the 
prime example of how NATO could act collectively to prevent atrocities when the U.N. 
either could or would not. 
Robert Kagan also does not dismiss institutions in toto, but finds that institutions like the 
United Nations are counterproductive because it has no effective means of enforcement 
behind its curtain of committees and declarations. Alternatively, he suggests “a global 
concert or league of democracies...with the aim of holding regular meetings and 
consultations among democratic nations on the issues of the day.”235 The advantage to 
this sort of association, according to Kagan, is that by not giving a vote to autocratic 
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regimes, a democratic league could act faster to enact preemptive action against 
autocratic states that attack other nations or their own people. Yes, a democratic league 
would be slightly less legitimate than the United Nations, insofar as legitimacy is derived 
internationally through every state, good or bad, having a voice. The democratic league 
would be, ironically, less democratic than the U.N., but this would be a necessary trade-
off for the sake of prudence and efficacy. 
Of course, there already are two democratic leagues of sorts already in existence. The 
most recently formed coalition, the Community of Democracies, doesn’t have much 
power or influence. (Indeed, its most important attribute might be that its member nations 
combine to form the United Nations’ democracy caucus). The other is NATO, which 
neoconservatives praise when it acts in accordance with the United States but scorn when 
it refuses to do the U.S.’ bidding, like with Iraq. If it is “obvious that the NATO alliance 
[is] too large and unwieldy to take effective military action,”236 why would a larger 
democratic league which would presumably include large states like India and Brazil be 
any ‘better’? It is more likely that any sort of institution will be met with some 
reservation by neoconservatives. 
Tying Institutions to the National Interest: Why Neoconservatives Mistrust 
Institutions More Broadly 
Neoconservatives are fundamentally skeptical of international institutions because they 
believe that national interests are not the same for every nation. The United Nations 
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presupposes that its member states are committed to the promotion of human rights, 
personal liberties, and a general commitment of non-violence, as defined it in its charter. 
But the ability of the United Nations act as an enforcement mechanism in defense of 
these values depends on its member nations’ definition of national interest. If the majority 
of countries are committed to the promotion of the U.N charter’s ideals, then the U.N. 
might be functional in enforcing the commitment to its values. But given that a large 
number of its member states not only do not prioritize those values, but they actively 
work to suppress them in their own countries, this is unlikely. Moreover, even if 
autocracies provide lip service to non-violence, maintaining power domestically will take 
priority over cosmopolitan values in the long run.  
The same principle applies to the neoconservatives’ view of NATO. The monadic 
democratic peace theory assumes that democratic nations are more peaceful. It does not, 
however, assume that democracies will naturally work together to promote liberal norms, 
engage in humanitarian interventions, or undermine autocratic regimes. Neoconservatives 
would argue that it would be in their best interest to do so, but are not willing to assume a 
high level of diligence, let alone zeal, to these goals. In fact, they are often skeptical of 
European states’ commitment to democracy and human rights promotion,237 and it for 
this reason that they are skeptical of NATO, despite the alliance consisting entirely of 
democracies committed to a common defense. When the group truly believes another 
nation to be a threat to the collective, they will act in cohesion. But the very fact that 
NATO’s Article V is frequently used as an argument against expansion indicates that 
respective national interests are not uniform. Harder still is convincing the larger 
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institution that future autocratic threats warrants action. And, as Muravchik states, 
“experience has shown that collegial decision making rarely results in any action, 
collective or otherwise, and can never substitute for the galvanizing effect of a single, 
effective leader.”238 Though the world consists of fragmentary anarchy, democracies are 
often content to stick to their non-anarchical fragments. Even when war was quite near to 
many NATO states’ territorial border, as was the case in Bosnia, action took three years, 
with neoconservatives constantly pointing this out until NATO finally did intervene.239 
 Moreover, if the United Nations was made up entirely of democracies, it would still have 
enforcement problems. Muravchik uses the same logic here that he does with his 
assessment of NATO, noting that even if all member states in the U.N. were law-abiding, 
the “U.N. can solve no problem for which its individual members are unwilling to accept 
the costs and risks of solving” by themselves.240 The U.N. “invites an evasion of 
responsibility,” paralleling Mearsheimer’s concept of buck-passing. The only redeeming 
quality of the U.N. for Muravchik is that it can promote peace “not in replacing American 
power but by sanctifying its exercise, as in Korea and Kuwait.”241 Because of the 
diversity of interests amongst member states, even if they were democratic, institutions 
are unwieldy and victims of their own size. 
It should be unsurprising that the most famed neoconservative foreign policy 
recommendation is unilateral preemptive intervention performed by the United States. In 
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the absence of a ‘coalition of the willing’ dedicated to democracy promotion, a singular 
great power can perform the function that an international institution or even an alliance 
often cannot, for it is more likely that one democratic nation will view its national interest 
as tied to democracy and human rights promotion than many. Neoconservatives all 
contend that the United States must remain hegemon, viewing “American primacy in the 
international system [as] a stroke of good fortune for the rest of the world, since America 
does not seek to conquer and oppress, but rather to liberate and democratize, and offers 
public goods to all.”242 Boot advocates openly for American imperialism, Krauthammer 
for the prolongation of the ‘Unipolar Moment’, and virtually all neoconservatives assent 
to the idea that U.S. should in some capacity act as the world’s policeman. Ultimately, 
their rationale is that because threats stemming from non-democratic nations cannot be 
combated by international institutions, the United States must be the primary actor in 
world politics. In a world of fragmentary anarchy, there is no better option. 
Despite appearing to be so at times, neoconservatism does not unequivocally call for 
regime change and unilateralism all at once. After all, what all neoconservatives share is 
commitment to pragmatism, what Peter Berkowitz calls “flexibility in solving problems 
as opposed to insistence on solutions that conform to religious or metaphysical dogma or 
rigid moral and political agendas.”243 But pragmatism has to do with problem solving, not 
the description of the problem, which is the determination of how states act in an 
international system. Thus neoconservatives do conform to a dogma of sorts, the 
assumptions derived from the monadic democratic peace theory. 
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Chapter 6: Neoconservatism Is Not Neoclassical Realism 
Thus far, I have established that neoconservatism, though partially sharing the most basic 
tenets of neorealism, primarily uses second image factors to its explanation of state 
actions. However, the rise of neoclassical realism blurs the lines between realism and 
neoconservative. Specifically, neoclassical realism’s insertion of domestic level factors 
into neorealism’s structural theory at first glance seems to appear similar to 
neoconservatism. As such, “if many of the current generation of realists are to be 
believed, examining democracy as a factor in international relations should not disqualify 
neoconservatism from the realist tradition, so long as it is done to study its effect on the 
generation of international political power.”244 
I contend that this is not the case. While there are many overlapping elements between 
neoconservatism and neoclassical realism, at their cores they are fundamentally different 
— while neoclassical realism uses state level factors to complement its structural 
foundation, neoconservatism starts with regime type and uses it to portray the world in a 
fragmentary anarchical manner. That is, while neoclassical realism holds that the 
systemic outcomes of neorealism are often altered by state-level factors, neoconservatism 
says that outcomes are primarily predicted by the nature of regimes. As such, 
neoconservatism is no closer neoclassical realism as it is to pure Innenpolitik theories. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I briefly describe the origins of 
neoclassical realism and how it differs from pure structural realism. Second, I summarize 
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Jonathan Caverley’s argument that neoconservatism is essentially a variation of 
neoclassical realism. Finally, I explain that Caverley’s argument depends on a loose 
definition of neoclassical realism and a misunderstanding of neoconservatism. 
This chapter addresses probably the most direct attempt to label neoconservatism using 
the language of international relations theory. Unlike other articles which merely address 
areas of IR theory that neoconservatism can shed light on, Caverley directly labels 
neoconservatism as an existing IR theory, which is why I feel it is important to engage 
with it. Moreover, in this paper I am arguing that neoconservatism is an IR theory, and I 
frame it using the language of the democratic peace theory, which firmly puts it in the 
liberal camp. This chapter will further argue that neoconservatism should be placed under 
the liberal umbrella and not, like Caverly argues, the realist. 
The label “neoclassical realism” was first coined by Gideon Rose, current editor of 
Foreign Affairs, in 1998. Though Rose describes neoclassical realism as a theory of 
foreign policy, which is how it is normally applied at a case-study level, it works just as 
well as a theory of international relations because it is primarily begins not with the 
foreign policy of any particular state or group of states, but the causal logic behind state 
action more generally. Moreover, offensive and defensive realism, two theories that Rose 
directly compares neoclassical realism to, are also theories of international relations. 
Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, whenever Rose refers to neoclassical realism as a 
theory of foreign policy, the same logic can be applied to it as a theory of international 
relations. 
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Neoclassical realism at its most basic level a variant of realism. While this may be stating 
the obvious, this most important aspect of neoclassical realism is not the most important 
for neoconservatism, and as such needs to be emphasized for the sake of 
differentialization. Gideon Rose states that for neoclassical realists, “the scope and 
ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the 
international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is 
why they are realist.”245 State action will over the long term be shaped by its material 
wealth and military capabilities.246 Brian Rathburn argues that neoclassical realism is “the 
natural outgrowth of neorealism” and actually “vindicates Waltz” because it indicates 
“that when domestic politics and ideas interfere substantially in foreign policy decision 
making, the system punishes states.”247 Systemic variables are the independent variable 
for neoclassical realists, just as they are for offensive and defensive realism.248 
Insofar as neoclassical realism differentiates itself from other forms of realism by 
incorporating second image variables into its analysis, Caverly argues that 
“neoconservatism is neoclassical realism”, for which he gives two reasons. First, 
neoconservatism acknowledges the existence of key neorealist concepts, such as anarchy 
and balancing. He says that “like neoconservatism, neoclassical realism generally 
assumes that as a state’s international political power waxes and wanes, so too does its 
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efforts to influence other states.”249 Second, neoconservatism incorporates second image 
factors into their analysis of state behavior. As shown in prior chapters, neoconservatives 
emphasize the importance of regime type in guiding the foreign policy decisions of states. 
Caverley writes that “neoconservatism acknowledges that if domestic factors affect a 
state’s ability to balance against threat or power, a strategic actor should incorporate other 
states’ domestic factors into its geopolitical calculus. Intervening in other states’ internal 
affairs becomes a form of balancing.”250 
Moreover, a large number of neoclassical realist works have analyzed “whether state 
leaders have the power to convert the nation’s economic power into military power or 
translate the nation’s economic and military power into foreign policy action.” With this 
in mind, it is not a sizeable logical jump to replace ‘economic power’ with ‘regime type’, 
for as neoconservatives argue, regime type has an instrumental role in translating military 
might into foreign policy action. Caverley quotes Rathburn to make his point, saying: 
Power can be used only if it can be mobilised. Two variables are particularly 
important for this: the state’s extractive ability and inspirational capacity”. 
Neoclassical realism does not limit itself to material variables, but even so, 
“identity and ideology are used primarily as part of self-help (Rathbun, 2008: 
303). Neoconservatism could not agree more.251 
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Rose himself hints at this possibility, saying that “instead of viewing ideas as either 
purely independent or purely dependent variables, future neoclassical realists could 
explore how, in conjunction with relative power, they could play both roles 
simultaneously.”252 Because neoconservatism emphasizes the importance of relative 
power while noting that it is not superior to regime type, it is possible that 
neoconservatism would match with Rose’s recommendation. Given the many variants of 
neoclassical realism, regime type and the democratic peace theory could potentially be 
used as the main differentiating variable between pure structural theory and neoclassical 
realism, at least if we to believe Caverly and Rose. 
Caverley’s argument, though compelling, is flawed for two reasons. First, it 
misunderstands what makes neoclassical realism different than liberal or epistemic 
international relations theories. In order for the neoconservatism-neoclassical realism 
synthesis to work, Caverly relies on a particular reading of neoclassical realism that is 
highly contested. His widening of neoclassical realism opens it up to potentially counting 
neoconservatism as one of its variants, but this widening is misguided. 
Moravcsik and Legro have to date made the most thorough critique of neoclassical 
realism and make several arguments that align with Caverly. They argue that neoclassical 
realism is neither unique nor parsimonious enough to be considered its own distinct 
theory. It is not unique because many other theories hold some of the same starting points 
as realism, such as institutionalism and liberalism, and also incorporate other factors that 
lead them to different conclusions about state behavior than realism. They write that: 
                                                
252 Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p.169. 
104 
nearly all agree […] that states are self-interested and their preferences, at least in 
security matters, lie somewhere between security and power […] a measure of 
conflict over underlying values and interests, all modern theories agree, is 
endemic to world politics. Nearly all concur, furthermore, that governments 
generally place a high, perhaps superordinate, value on national security, 
territorial integrity, and political independence.253  
Moreover, oftentimes neoclassical realists emphasize these supposedly subordinate 
second-level factors over structural forces, raising the question of how realist neoclassical 
realism really is. If second image factors “consistently fail to correspond to material 
power relationships, then power is at best one of a number of important factors and 
perhaps a secondary one. The parsimony and coherence of realist theory is eroded.”254 
While Legro and Moravcsik question the usefulness of neoclassical realism as a research 
method on these grounds, Caverley takes it as a given that neoclassical realism can stand 
alone as an international relations theory while at the same time accepting its sometimes 
ad hoc nature as a given. He argues that wide net of neoclassical realism and its lack of 
uniqueness do not mean that it should be disregarded, but maybe other theories that also 
incorporate the basic core of neorealism while adding second image factors can be 
considered as neoclassical realist. Therefore, Caverley comes to the conclusion that 
neoconservatism’s “[incorporation of] what one author (Levy, 1988) has called ‘as close 
as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’ is no less reasonable 
than many of the ad hoc additions of neoclassical realism to its structural antecedent, and 
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considerably more parsimonious than some versions.”255 Neoclassical realism’s looseness 
had come to be enough to include neoconservatism as one of its variants. 
This looseness partially comes from an identity crisis on the part of neoclassical realism. 
There has been much debate about whether neoclassical realism is a break from, variant 
of, or natural progression from structural realism. Onea argues that there are three strains 
of neoclassical realism, which he labels as orthodox, semi-orthodox, and revisionist.256 
Orthodox neoclassical realism says that states can act against what structural factors 
would normally dictate it to do, but these decisions will always be temporary because the 
system discourages that type of behavior. Semi-orthodox neoclassical realism is similar 
to orthodox, but it incorporates domestic politics. Revisionist neoclassical realism “goes 
the furthest [away from structural realism] by contesting the absolute authority of the 
international system,” and instead “contends that a state’s motivation is principally 
shaped by the strategic context of its interactions with other states.”257 Foulon argues that 
neoclassical realism explains the options that states have in the context of systemic 
pressures, especially if there are competing domestic and international pressures. Though 
for him, “the structural context of foreign policy is predominant and enjoys analytical 
supremacy over domestic interests,” varying perceptions of timeframe and threat levels 
allow states to have some flexibility in appeasing domestic interests.258 
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Other scholars argue that neoclassical realism must reaffirm the findings of structural 
realism. Rathburn argues that Moravcsik and Legro (and by extension Caverley) “fail to 
understand that realist theories are as much about the consequences of behavior as about 
the determinants of behavior” and a result don’t recognize that neoclassical realism 
predicts that in the long run the structure of the world system will punish states that are 
overly influenced by second image factors and ignore their material national interest.259 
Like structural realism, neoclassical realism “leads us to the assumption that if domestic 
politics are allowed to distract from genuine state interests, and if ideas are allowed to 
color objective perceptions to a significant degree, the system will discipline the state 
through these mechanisms in the form of foreign policy failure.”260 Variables like 
nationalism and a state’s inability to translate economic might into military might may 
alter a state’s behavior, but if this altered behavior continues, eventually this deviation 
will have consequences. For this reason, Rathbun, quoting Schweller, calls neoclassical 
realism a “theory of mistakes.” 
Only if we take the loosest reading of neoclassical realism such as made by Moravcsik 
and Legro can the affinity between the neoclassical realism and neoconservatism hold. 
But even this reading, which barely constitutes a unique theory, still holds that systemic 
factors have the most influence on state decision making, even if they are not as 
influential as structural realists like to portray them. Neoconservatism does not hold this. 
Neoconservatism does not think that second level factors will always lead to the system 
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punishing a state for its errors. In fact, the opposite in some cases is true — the structure 
of the international system might lead to a democratic state balancing alongside an 
authoritarian one, which in the long run is more likely than not to dissolve because 
inherent friction between autocratic regimes and democracies, ‘punishing’ the democratic 
state. In fact, Joshua Muravchik explicitly rejects the orthodox and semi-orthodox models 
of neoclassical realism, writing: 
To compare the records of realism and neoconservatism we must first define our 
terms. Realism consists of two mutually contradictory propositions. One holds 
that states are bound to behave according to their innate interests. Thus, Hans 
Morgenthau argued that politics is ―governed by objective laws whose 
―operation [is] impervious to our preferences. The other holds that states may 
deviate from their interests but ought not to do so. Neocons believe that we will 
find more safety using our power to try to fashion a more benign world order. On 
these points, neocons are liberal internationalists.261 
If systemic factors are relegated to secondary status by neoclassical realism, I would have 
to agree with Legro and Moravcsik that neoclassical realism is nothing more than some 
form of liberalism or constructivism with the words ‘anarchy’ and ‘structure’ sprinkled 
in. Therefore, unless Caverley is willing to isolate neoclassical realism from other 
theories, his argument reads more as a critique of neoclassical realism’s identity crisis 
than an analysis of neoconservatism. 
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The second flaw in Caverley’s logic is that it misrepresents neoconservatism. This 
misrepresentation allows him to draw a direct parallel with neoclassical realist theories 
that address a similar subject matter, the ability of a state to translate material wealth into 
military power. Thus, even if we were to assume that Caverley’ characterization of 
neoclassical realism was an accurate representation of it, his overall contention that 
neoconservatism is neoclassical realism is based on false premises of neoconservatism.  
 Specifically, he portrays neoconservative foreign policy as skeptical of democracy 
because leads a state to not transfer a proportionate amount of its material wealth into 
military power. He writes that “neoconservatism seeks to point out the debilitating effects 
of democracy that prevent such a government from spending appropriate levels of its 
wealth on military power, and from employing any military power that it does 
possess.”262 Because “a democracy’s responsiveness to voters [...] produces unfortunate 
side effects that include: a perverse welfare state, an inattention to foreign policy and 
consequent military decline.”263 
However, this argument twists neoconservatism into something it is not. 
Neoconservatives do not universally believe that “the liberal welfare state underinvests in 
military power” because “voters will choose butter over guns”.264 Irving Kristol may 
have, but he also based this on the idea that capitalism will lead to nihilism, something 
that the neocons, who came later, do not explore in depth. Kristol thought that capitalism, 
while being good for economic growth, leads to an overly decadent, materialist society. 
Wants expand at a rate that outpaces even a high growth rate. Moreover, wants expand 
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across all classes, while growth under capitalism is often uneven across classes. These 
wants translate to the populace demanding more economic guarantees and services from 
the government, constraining the government’s budget. Military spending will eventually 
be reduced to make up for this.265 
Neoconservatives do believe that regime type has varying effects on a state’s ability to 
make war; this is fundamental to the underlying logic of neoconservatism. But it is a 
stretch to claim that neoconservatives believe that democracies are weaker than 
autocracies. Indeed, several neoconservatives have made arguments contrary to 
Caverley’s claim. Caverley cites Kagan and Kristol as saying “American civilians at 
home, preoccupied with the distribution of tax breaks and government benefits, will not 
come to their support when the going gets tough”, but this misconstrues their 
argument.266 They contend in the next sentence that “weak political leadership and a poor 
job of educating the citizenry to the responsibilities of global hegemony” are the cause of 
American ambivalence towards the military, not the inevitability of democratic norms.267 
On the contrary, they are optimistic about whether Americans will rally behind the flag, 
writing that “the American people can be summoned to meet the challenges of global 
leadership if statesmen make the case loudly, cogently, and persistently. As troubles arise 
and the need to act becomes clear, those who have laid the foundation for a necessary 
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shift in policy have a chance to lead Americans onto a new course.”268 Kagan also has 
contended that given the choice to be a global leader, “if the past is any guide, they will 
make it” albeit “with hesitation, uncertainty, and misgivings.”269 The American mood in 
regards to military spending depends on government leadership, not regime 
characteristics. 
Kagan for his part does condemn Europeans for spending, in their mind, too much 
domestic on their bloated welfare states and not enough on defense. But he argues that 
Europeans do this not because they are democracies but for two reasons. First, during the 
Cold War “the American nuclear guarantee deprived Europeans of the incentive to spend 
the kind of money that would have been necessary to restore them to military great-power 
status.”270 Second, using a very constructivist argument (a far cry from neoclassical 
realism) Europeans have been conditioned to believe that spending money on defense 
leads to war.  
Europeans today are not ambitious for power, and Europeans over the past half 
century have developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in 
international relations, a perspective that springs directly from their unique 
historical experience since the end of World War II. They have rejected the power 
politics that brought them such misery over the past century and more. This is a 
perspective on power that Americans do not and cannot share, inasmuch as the 
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formative historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the 
same.271 
Conclusion 
Contrary to the work of Jonathan Caverley, neoconservatism is not neoclassical realism. 
Harking back to chapter four, neoconservatism to a large extent holds the three core 
assumptions of liberalism, all of which necessitates viewing international relations theory 
in a manner that evaluates the internal workings of a state instead starting with structural 
evaluations. This should not come as a surprise, for in chapter five I claimed that the 
neoconservative idea of fragmentary anarchy actually describes conditions in which the 
assumption of realists hold.  
To be sure, there are numerous examples of articles that claim to evaluate foreign policy 
using a neoclassical lens that do not explain how the system punishes states that deviate 
from the structural conception of the national interest.272 But that is an indictment on 
neoclassical realism and not a reason to pigeonhole neoconservative in the realist camp. 
At the end of the day, the neoconservative emphasis on regime types is too instrumental 
to say that it is a realist theory.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Thus far I have compared neoconservatism directly to liberal theory, contrasted it with 
the parties of the neo-neo synthesis, neorealism and neoliberalism, and pinpointed where 
neoconservatism diverges from it. Lastly, I have also differentiated neoconservatism from 
neoclassical realism, and assuming that the latter is indeed directly derived from 
structural realism, as opposed to being an ad hoc liberal theory, the two are actually quite 
distinct. It must then be asked whether I have successfully answered my initial set of 
questions from chapter one — can neoconservatism be considered an international 
relations theory, or is it something else? 
In this chapter I explain that the answer is yes because neoconservatism meets the criteria 
that I laid out in chapter two. But I caution that neoconservatism as an IR theory, in the 
manner of which I have presented it, may not be representative of any particular 
neoconservative thinker, and thus not all of the arguments that I make in this paper can be 
used to analyze the beliefs of any particular thinker. I also explain what further research 
can be done on the intersection of IR theory and neoconservatism. 
Neoconservatism is an IR Theory 
In order to assess whether neoconservatism can be regarded as a theory of international 
relations, it is necessary to refer back to the criteria I used in chapter two to ascertain 
what is and what is not an IR theory. I was purposefully vague in my standards for IR 
theory; in some ways my definitions set the qualification bar rather low. But this was 
done not out of attempting to make it easier for the answer of the larger question to be 
‘yes’, but out of mindfulness of the wide range of theories that already exist. Were a more 
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stringent definition used, such as those used by structural realists, most critical theories 
would not be classified as IR theories. That my standards were vague is indicative of the 
lack of agreement amongst theorists themselves. 
Three requirements were laid out in order for neoconservatism to qualify as a theory. 
First, theories cannot be specific to any particular state or group of states. This 
requirement was given to separate IR theories from theories of foreign policy, with a 
caveat that some or even many theories of international relations are eclectic in some 
way. The language that neoconservatives use in the derivation of their assumptions of the 
monadic democratic peace theory speak of the descriptions of states at an aggregate level. 
Democratic states are more benevolent than authoritarian regimes. Though 
neoconservatives speak of particular states such as those in the ‘Axis of Evil’, this is done 
as means of differentiating these states as especially menacing (at least to the United 
States) in the short term. They still apply their assumptions surrounding the democratic 
peace theory to these states, and veritably use these states to back up their assumptions. 
In this way, no authoritarian regime is outside criticism from neoconservatives.  
Furthermore, when neoconservatives speak of the national interest, as noted in chapter 
five, they also speak at the aggregate level. Neoconservatives deny a universal national 
interest, almost in a constructivist manner, again not addressing particular states but 
whether states more broadly are subject to the same set of incentives when determining a 
national interest. Thus, the first requirement is met. 
Second, given that neoconservatism is framed in this paper as an ontological manner, is 
neoconservatism categorized by a set of ideas that explain or predict the behavior of 
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states or other unit of international relations analysis? The answer to this question is also 
yes. Neoconservatism explains that authoritarian states are more likely to start wars than 
democracies. Using the language of the monadic democratic peace theory, 
neoconservatism lays out both normative and institutional rationales for why democracies 
are more benevolent than non-democracies. They predict that autocracies cannot in the 
long run remain allied with democracies, for the liberal ideals promoted by democracies 
inherently undermine the sources of legitimacy for autocracies. And, assuming that 
autocracies cannot preserve a robust economy indefinitely to keep its constituents 
satisfied, eventually they will have to resort to some sort of adventuring abroad to create 
nationalistic support. Moreover, neoconservatives articulate why international institutions 
are not effective at promoting peace and human rights amongst its members, and, more 
broadly, why even coalitions made up entirely of democracies are difficult to coordinate, 
especially when membership is large. As interests are not guaranteed to be unified, only 
against direct threats will an organization of this kind, like NATO, readily mobilize. 
Finally, neoconservatism’s conception of fragmentary anarchy explains the conditions in 
which anarchy exists, in a way improving upon the unyielding, universal anarchy of the 
neo-neo synthesis. Therefore, neoconservatism rather directly both explains and predicts 
the behavior of states,  
The final criterion that was used to define an ontological international relations theory 
was that it “demonstrates empirical accuracy vis-a-vis other theories.” Tentatively I 
would argue that it does this. Neoconservatism, by basing its most basic assumptions 
around the idea that regime types matter and that national interests are not uniform, 
problematizes structural theories that treat states as black boxes. More pointedly, 
115 
neoconservatives contend that the interests of an authoritarian regime begin and end with 
the prolongation of the regime. These interests may often overlap with neorealist ideas of 
interest such as survival, hegemony, or “autonomy of their domestic order, but they do 
not always. These neorealist principles assume that the interests and wants of the 
populace are negligibly different from those of their governments and can be analyzed 
under the cover of a black box. Neoconservatives argue that while can be done with 
democracies, where institutional constraints force politicians to more closely align their 
decision making with those of their constituents, this cannot be assumed for non-
democracies. This allows neoconservatives explain the causes for conflict that don’t 
necessarily make sense under structural theories. Russia’s incursion into South Ossetia 
and Donetsk, for instance, were not for any prima facie security seeking interests. And 
the lack of institutional checks and balances in non-democratic states allow their regimes 
to take greater risks at the expense of objective security interests, as was the case with the 
wars of Saddam Hussein. 
But Is It? 
With these three criteria being met, neoconservatism certainly can be considered a theory 
of international relations, with the operative word here being ‘can’. Neoconservatism is 
significantly more eclectic than most standard IR theories, and certainly more than 
structural theories such as neoliberalism or neorealism. Neoconservatism, as laid out in 
chapter three, includes ideas not only about foreign policy and international relations, but 
116 
also economics, domestic politics, and societal moral health.273 Unlike other theories, 
neoconservatism means a lot of things to a lot of different people, and outside of this 
paper, these things do not include ‘international relations theory’. Unlike other theories, 
there is no ‘Neoconservative Theory of International Politics’ that most, maybe not even 
any, neoconservatives would give their approval of, including my attempt here to create 
one. As put David Brooks flippantly put it, “If you ever read a sentence that starts with 
‘Neocons believe,’ there is a 99.44 percent chance everything else in that sentence will be 
untrue.”274 I don’t doubt that Brook’s fictitious ‘99.44%’ probability could equally apply 
to neoconservatives’ disagreement with this very thesis. 
Inherent in this thesis from the beginning was that I have essentially been “working 
backward” in terms of theory building. Instead of starting with a set of assumptions, 
principles, or ideas and building a coherent theory around these, I have had to extract 
assumptions, principles, and ideas out of a group of thinkers loosely grouped, sometimes 
via self-identification but often not, under the umbrella term “neoconservative”. Part of 
this process involved parsing through writings of topics that were not related to 
international relations theory, even writings that can also be considered theories in their 
own right, just not ones of international relations. Two questions emerge from this. First, 
though I have shown that neoconservatism is a set of ideas that explain or predict the 
behavior of states, how cohesive does a theory need to be in order to be considered a “set 
of ideas”. Second, even though neoconservatism meets my definition of international 
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relations theory, given that its adherents write on varied topics, how should 
neoconservatism be referred to? Should it be viewed exclusively as an IR theory, or 
should it be referred to as something else? 
On the first question, for any other theory the adherents of that theory would be labeled 
as such because of their agreement with a basic set of assumptions and logic of said 
theory. Structural realists, for example, are labeled in this way because of their 
affirmation of the basic principles of structural realism as outlined by Kenneth Waltz. For 
neoconservative international relations theory, this is obviously impossible. 
Neoconservative IR theory is this case is labeled as such only because of their 
relationship with already existing neoconservatives. At the same time, through my 
research I found that the vast majority of neoconservatives, in particular the 
neoconservatives that came to prominence after the end of the Cold War, agree with the 
key tenets of neoconservative IR theory that were outlined in chapter four and five. There 
are some scholars that explicitly agree with some of these assumptions, but have not 
commented on others. There are scholars that agree with these assumptions, like Irving 
Kristol, but disagreed with policy prescriptions. Could then a scholar that is labeled as a 
neoconservative thus be “unlabeled” as a neoconservative because they don’t adhere to 
the tenets neoconservative IR theory? In short, yes, but only in the field of international 
relations theory. That is, a scholar could be a neoconservative in economics, philosophy, 
or even foreign policy, but not necessarily be a neoconservative in terms of IR theory. 
Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and many of what Vaïsse labels as a 
118 
the “first generation of neoconservatives”275 would fall under this category as they only 
sparsely even addressed foreign policy, let alone international relations. 
Additionally, we should be wary about jumping to excommunicate a neoconservative the 
moment they disagree with any of the core assumptions of neoconservative IR theory. As 
put by Caverley, “Anyone who edits a weekly journal, contributes a regular column to the 
Washington Post or simply has written for 50 years is likely to produce pieces that 
contradict the central premises of a theory. Not every piece written by a 
‘neoconservative’ should be given equal standing in deliberating over 
neoconservatism.”276 
Therefore, to answer the second question, neoconservatism cannot be regarded as a 
monolith. If we are to accept that neoconservatives across different eras are 
fundamentally different, and yet still are neoconservatives, we can also accept that a 
scholar can be considered a neoconservative in particular fields but not others, and also 
still be considered a neoconservative. Neoconservatism should be compartmentalized 
across both time and field, and when referred to it should always be put into context. 
Given the highly politicized nature surrounding neoconservatism, this may be difficult, 
especially when referring to a particular person. But for the sake of accuracy and 
definitional clarity, the kind of neoconservative should always be stipulated. 
Future Research 
                                                
275 Vaïsse, Justin. Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. 
276 Caverley, Jonathan D. “Power and Democratic Weakness: Neoconservatism and Neoclassical Realism.” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38, no. 3 (May 2010): 593–614, p. 596. 
119 
With this in mind, there still remains an opening for a neoconservative scholar to expand 
on the ideas that I have written here and create a definitive, seminal work of 
neoconservative international relations theory. Unlike the tenants of neoconservatism that 
I outlined, where I compiled the ideas of many neoconservative thinkers into one theory, 
a more complete theory would systematically defend these tenants against other theories 
within IR. The assumptions of the monadic democratic peace theory, for instance, would 
have to be defended in a more in-depth manner. 
There are a couple of ways that this can be done. First, neoconservatives should expand 
on the philosophical logic of the monadic democratic peace theory. They should respond 
to critics of Kant and further develop the internal logic of the monadic democratic peace. 
Along these lines, neoconservatives could elaborate on their conception of the national 
interest, addressing the works of constructivists like Alexander Wendt directly. More 
importantly, they should reconcile their liberal and constructivist conceptions of the 
national interest, that the national interest is shaped both by regime type and historical 
conditioning. Are these ideas competing or, more likely, are they mutually compatible. It 
would be logical to start with neoconservatism’s liberal assumptions, that the internal 
structures of a state work to constrain democracies to the interests of the populace, 
whereas autocracies are primarily interested the survival of the regime. Historical 
conditioning can then explain in more detail the particulars of how a government were to 
work in support of these basic interests. 
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Second, they could use empirical methods to demonstrate that democracies are truly more 
peaceful than autocracies. Using a methodology similar to Maoz and Abdolali’s study277 
on the merits of the dyadic democratic theory, neoconservatives could do the same for its 
Kantian cousin, coding wars based on whether the instigator in a conflict was democratic 
or non-democratic. As alluded to earlier, Muravchik disputed the methods of Bruce 
Russett’s study on regime type and war, noting that the latter’s study doesn’t take into 
account whose fault a war was. Obviously “fault” would have to be more narrowly 
defined; it might involve defining and distinguishing between wars of aggression and 
defensive wars. Neoconservatives have already sought to redefine what is a defensive 
war in order for the definition to include preemptive wars like the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq.278 A natural extension of this reformulation would be use it to quantitatively show 
that democracies are historically more benevolent than non-democracies. Such a study 
would certainly be controversial, given the contentious debate surrounding the legitimacy 
of defensive wars, but it would nevertheless be beneficial for neoconservatives to directly 
counter the empirical studies that undermine their theoretical basis. 
Conclusion 
Despite not having a seminal work to call its own, neoconservatism should still be taken 
seriously by international relations scholars. This paper has articulated that 
neoconservatism has a coherent theoretical basis, with assumptions about regime types 
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and the national interest that directly challenge existing ontological theories. But 
neoconservatism should be taken seriously because it is relevant at a foreign policy level, 
and arguably the most influential theory of international relations. 
It is the most influential for a few reasons. First, their assumptions directly translate to 
foreign policy; in this sense, its eclectic nature is an asset. For neoconservatives, the 
natural foreign policy for the United States in world where democracies are under threat 
from menacing non-democracies, where national interests are not uniform, and where 
institutions are ineffective, is greater use of the U.S. military to curtail the power of 
various dictators and to intervene when those dictators inevitably become threats to their 
own people. Second, though a few other theories have direct foreign policy guidance, 
these policy implications either are vague or ineffective. Realism, though simple in its 
advocating for action in support of a national interest, can have different meanings for 
different people. For Stephen Walt, realist foreign policy is cautious and not over-
ambitious. But John Bolton also has a realist worldview, and his interpretation of the 
national interest induces an ultra-hawkish foreign policy. Institutionalist theories can, like 
realism, evoke caution, but more pointedly advocate for addressing problems through 
international institutions. Policymakers who take this sort of action are often confronted 
with the realities of institutions with limited enforcement mechanisms, and thus are easily 
criticized by neoconservatives. Third, neoconservatism is coherent in an American 
political landscape that at the foreign policy level is thoroughly incoherent. Because its 
assumptions are well defined, it becomes easy to distinguish itself from the mélange of 
ad hoc foreign policy recommendations. Few U.S. politicians or policymakers have 
consistent foreign policy positions. Some are liberal interventionists, some are realists, 
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and others are isolationists. But the vast majority address world problems on a case by 
case basis; without an underlying ideology and set of principles to fall back on, like 
neoconservatives do, it is easy to for a foreign policy to become irregular. Though 
neoconservative foreign policy is not the same as neoconservative IR, the assumptions of 
the former are informed by the explanations of behavior described by the latter. 
It is because neoconservatives have a coherent set of assumptions to fall back on when 
making foreign policy decisions that it is important to understand these assumptions and 
neoconservative international relations theory as a whole. Without addressing 
neoconservative international relations, neoconservatism cannot be accurately 
understood. 
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